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MINDING THE PROTECTION GAP: RESOLVING 
UNINTENDED, PERVASIVE, PROFOUND HOMEOWNER 
UNDERINSURANCE 
KENNETH S. KLEIN* 
A significant majority of homeowners in the United States 
unwittingly have less insurance than necessary to rebuild their home in the 
                                                     
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. Louis & 
Hermione Brown Professorship in Preventative Law. 
Writing on insurance, construction, and economics is challenging, 
because there is so little publicly available information about insurance, and 
so little economics or construction information that is published for the 
uninitiated. As a consequence, even non-controversial propositions – such as 
that an insurance producer receives a commission on the amount of premium 
written, or that prices go up in the wake of natural disaster – can be difficult 
to source and support with citation. This article depended upon the 
generosity of many people who were willing to take my telephone calls and 
shared with me their time and expertise. My thanks to Professor Peter 
Siegelman from University of Connecticut School of Law; Professor Daniel 
Schwarcz from the University of Minnesota Law School; Professor Howard 
Kunreuther from The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; 
Professor Tom Baker from the University of Pennsylvania School of Law; 
Professor Jay Feinman from Rutgers Law; Professor Jeffrey Stempel from 
the UNLV – William S. Boyd School of Law; Professor Benjamin L. Collier 
from Temple University’s Department of Risk, Insurance, and Healthcare 
Management; Professor Peter Kochenburger from University of Connecticut 
School of Law; Amy Bach from United Policyholders; Valerie Saunders 
from the National Association of Mortgage Brokers; Guy Kopperund from 
CoreLogic; Todd Rissel from e2Value; Mark Whatley from Actionable 
Insights; Chris McCloy of Yapacopia; David Shaffer from David Shaffer 
Insurance Services; Gary T. Fye from Gary T. Fye Company; Attorney 
Frederick C. Berry, Jr.; Jonathan Klein from Safe Auto, Ins. Co. (I love you 
like a brother!); retired insurance executive Elliot Flood; Professor Martin 
Grace from Temple University Fox School of Business; Madelyn Flanagan, 
Vice President, Agent Development, Education, and Research of the 
Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of America, Inc.; and fire 
restoration contactor and author, Sean Scott. The generosity of these 
individuals should not be confused with their agreement with the views and 
assertions I make in this Article. All errors are entirely my own, and any 
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event of a complete loss. This persistent, multibillion-dollar protection gap 
first emerged in the 1990s and has never resolved despite a desire by most 
homeowners to contract for full replacement coverage. While a great deal of 
academic and industry literature has addressed the issue of underinsurance, 
the work has been done without reference to two sources that unlock the 
conundrum. The first is the 1550+ page administrative rulemaking file of the 
California Department of Insurance collected in the wake of wildfires in 
2007. The second is a deep understanding of the software insurers use to 
determine the adequacy of coverage limits when a homeowner purchases full 
replacement coverage. 
In addition to these two sources, this Article documents the problem 
of underinsurance and its causes by synthesizing both prior scholarship and 
primary source documents, including SEC filings, patents, industry websites, 
and interviews with trade organization representatives. After establishing 
the existence of widespread underinsurance, this Article demonstrates how 
the law’s treatment of risk allocation in the wake of inadequate insurance 
coverage encourages inaccurate coverage limits by uncoupling the risk 
created by inaccurately calculated coverage limits from the responsibility 
for the consequences of error. This Article concludes with a proposed 
regulation that would recouple risk and responsibility while still providing 
the insurance industry and consumers with the freedom to contract for 
alternative coverage limits. 
  
                                                     
opinions a reader disagrees with are entirely mine as well. 
Thanks to New Media Rights, it’s Executive Director, Professor Art 
Neill, and two of its student interns – Erika Lee and Sarah Borrelli – who 
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of the California Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, who 
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Insurance Companies, et al. v. Jones. Thanks to the excellent research 
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INTRODUCTION 
The vast majority of American homeowners do not have adequate 
homeowner insurance,1 and almost none of them know it. Today, the systems 
insurers use to identify recommended adequate coverage limits make 
incidences of profound, unintended underinsurance ubiquitous.2 
Understanding those systems is the key that unlocks the pervasive problem 
of unintended underinsurance, yet is an undertaking previously largely 
ignored by the academic and industry literature. 
Most homeowners never lose their home, and so have no reason to 
know whether their insurance is adequate. Until the 1990s, many if not most 
homeowners had “guaranteed replacement coverage,” meaning coverage to 
rebuild a home whatever the cost.3 This coverage has all but disappeared, 
however, and now the ubiquitous form of homeowner insurance, even if 
purportedly for “full” replacement of the home, has a coverage limit. As a 
consequence, pervasive underinsurance is a predictable news story in the 
wake of a natural disaster. In 2003, after the Cedar Fire in San Diego, 
                                                     
1 There is a lack of agreement regarding whether the correct generic 
titling of standard insurance covering the loss of a residence is 
“homeowners,” “homeowner’s,” “homeowners’,” or “homeowner” 
insurance. This Article adopts the later convention – “homeowner.” 
2 See Sara Nephew Hassani, Magnifying Disaster: The Causes and 
Consequences of Home Underinsurance 106 (April 2013) (unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, Princeton University) (“insurers are aware – and have 
been aware since at least the late 1930s – that insurance values are far below 
actual post-disaster replacement costs”). The reinsurer Swiss Re cautions that 
technically the delta between the economically ideal coverage and the 
insured loss is ‘underinsurance,’ while the delta between total economic loss 
and insured loss is a ‘protection gap.’ Swiss Re, Underinsurance of property 
risk: closing the gap, 5 SIGMA 1, 2 (2015), 
http://media.swissre.com/documents/sigma5_2015_en.pdf. This Article uses 
both the terms “underinsurance” and “protection gap” to refer to the 
difference between the coverage limits in a homeowner policy for 
replacement of a lost dwelling, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the 
actual cost to replace. This is also sometimes referred to as the need to have 
“insurance to value,” or ITV. 
3 See Kenneth S. Klein, When Enough Is Not Enough: Correcting Market 
Inefficiencies in the Purchase and Sale of Residential Property Insurance, 
18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y L. 345, 385 (2011); JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, 
DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT 
YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT 135-36 (2010). 
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California, the California Department of Insurance found itself besieged by 
stories of homeowners who were shocked to find they did not have enough 
insurance to rebuild their homes.4 The same happened after catastrophic 
California wildfires in 2007 and 2008.5 The Texas Department of Insurance 
received large numbers of homeowner complaints regarding denials, delays, 
and claims handling both after the 2011 wildfires and after Hurricane Harvey 
in 2017.6 In the wake of Hurricanes Irma and Maria, the Florida Division of 
Banking, Insurance and Financial Regulation received “a higher number of 
insurance claimants than the division expected” from “homeowners who had 
insurance policies that covered less than 80 percent of their property’s 
appraised replacement cost,” and while the division could not give a 
percentage as to how many homeowners were over 20% underinsured, the 
number was “high enough to warrant an emergency order issued by [the] 
division.”7 In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, litigation in Louisiana 
blossomed by homeowners who felt duped by the mistaken belief that they 
had sufficient insurance.8 The same happened in New Jersey after Hurricane 
                                                     
4 See, e.g., Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, 
§ 2695.183 at 1103, Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, 235 Cal. App. 4th 1009 
(2015) (No. B248622), rev’d, 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 395 (2017) (“The policy 
underlying the proposed action is to assure that homeowners receive from 
Department licensees more accurate replacement value estimates regarding 
their insured structures. The Department and the California Legislature 
received a significant number of complaints by homeowners who lost their 
residences in the Southern California wildfires of 2003....[F]ire survivors 
complained about problems including their experience that after the fire they 
learned that the replacement value estimates made in setting coverage limits 
for their homes was too low, causing underinsurance issues to arise during 
efforts to rebuild or replace their residences.”). 
5 Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 
2695.183, supra note 4, at 29-274, 319-1026. 
6 Tex. Dep’t of Ins. Response to TDI Open Records request 194243 (on 
file with author). 
7 Senate Hears of Post Hurricane Insurance Complaints, ST. JOHN 
SOURCE (Feb. 21. 2018), https://stjohnsource.com/2018/02/21/senate-hears-
explanation-of-post-hurricane-complaints/. See also Osbert E. Potter, 
Emergency Order on Underinsurance (Feb. 14, 2018), 
https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/ 
files/2018/02/emergency-order-on-underinsurance.pdf. 
8 See, e.g., Freeman v. Travelers Ins. Co., No. 06-8794, 2007 WL 519234 
(E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2007); Ruiz v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., No. 06-5640, 
2007 WL 128800 (E.D. La. Jan. 17, 2007); Halmekangas v. ANPAC La. Ins. 
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Sandy.9 
Natural disasters do not create, but rather expose and exacerbate the 
depth and breadth of underinsurance. When wildfires ravaged California in 
2007, the California Department of Insurance (“CDOI”) comprehensively 
studied the problem of underinsurance. The resulting 1550+ page 
administrative rulemaking file describes how insurers deploy software that 
purports to account for the likelihood of weather events causing mass loss 
and concomitant price surges. Yet even when a homeowner both relied on 
that software to calculate adequate coverage limits and bought 25%, 50%, 
100% or even more additional coverage on top of the coverage the insurer 
and/or producer recommended, over half of homeowners were still 
underinsured. Despite the dramatic findings of the CDOI, the administrative 
record has not been analyzed in any academic literature to date. Simply put, 
the academic record helps confirm what until now was only inferred – that 
across the United States, most homeowners are materially underinsured, and 
are unaware of that fact. Most homeowners think they have more than 
adequate insurance.  
                                                     
Co., 95 So. 3d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 2012); D’Amico v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 
No. 06-7174, 2007 WL 854308 (E.D. La. Mar. 15,2007); Dobson v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., Nos. 06-0252, 06-1097, 06-1064, 06-1255, 06-1734, 06-1585, 2006 
WL 2078423 (E.D. La. July 21, 2006); Campo v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 
06-7324, 2007 WL 840125 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2007); Tillery v. State Farm 
Fire and Cas. Ins. Co., No. 06-6876, 2007 WL 805785 (E.D. La.  Mar. 13, 
2007). These are the residential underinsurance cases from just the first 
twenty responsive cases to a Westlaw search in just Louisiana state and 
federal cases, searching for “‘Hurricane Katrina’ & underinsure!” (search 
performed on March 2, 2018). These cases often were reported – in other 
words, showed up in the WL database – only because of a federal district 
court decision on a remand motion after removal. Put another way, these 
cases are just the tip of the iceberg that was the post-Katrina underinsurance 
litigation. 
9 See, e.g., Linblad v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-908, 2014 WL 
6895775 (D. N.J. Dec. 4, 2014); Bannon v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 14-1229, 
2015 WL 778828 (D. N.J. Fed 24, 2015); Robert v. Liberty Mut. Ins., No 
14-06308, 2015 WL 4138990 (D. N.J. July 8, 2015). Again, these are just 
the first three of 92 responsive cases identified within Westlaw to the search 
– within just New Jersey state and federal cases – “‘Hurricane Sandy’ & 
insurance” (search conducted on March 3, 2018). All three of these cases 
involve homeowners who were underinsured and sued their insurers, and all 
are in the Westlaw database because of procedural motions leading to early 
written trial court orders. Like with Hurricane Katrina, this paints a 
suggestive picture of a much, much larger body of filed litigation. 
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The explanation for the prevalence of profound, unintended 
underinsurance lies with the cost estimator software insurers use to 
recommend coverage limits. The CDOI only briefly alluded to this software, 
and the academic world studying insurance appears largely unaware of it. 
These replacement cost estimators are at the heart of the problem. Through 
a combination of software design choices in the way that insurance is bought 
and sold, underinsurance is almost inevitable. For example, the software 
allows for a “shortcut” calculation rather than detailed analysis, and insurers 
compensate producers in ways that encourage using the shortcut. While the 
software can recalculate replacement costs and adequate coverage limits 
annually, producers are incentivized to not do so for fear of losing existing 
customers. The software requires time and expertise to accurately detail all 
construction components, but the deployment of the software usually relies 
on the homeowner to input data by answering a handful of questions in a few 
minutes. These are just some of many software features combined with 
incentives that routinely cause inadequate calculations of replacement costs 
that get worse over time. 
For insurers, the prevalence of inadequate and eroding coverage 
limits resulting from cost estimators is a feature, not a glitch. Cost estimating 
software creates the opportunity to capture and retain more market share by 
selling nominally ‘full’ but actually inadequate insurance coverage. It is an 
unusual market where a buyer wants and is willing to pay for a more 
expensive product than the seller has sold. What is particularly peculiar in 
homeowner insurance, however, is that the insurer is aware this is occurring, 
and the homeowner is not. As big data companies, insurers have known for 
the better part of three decades that most homeowner insurance has 
profoundly inadequate coverage limits, and that the policyholder does not 
know it. But the legal landscape frequently protects and encourages the 
insurer. Thus, under the current legal landscape of regulation, legislation, 
and decisional law, because of the ways cost estimators function and 
insurance is quoted, homeowners usually bear the cost of a shortfall. In turn, 
the insurer can more than make up in captured and retained business any 
actual liability for underinsurance. 
This is what many economists would call a ‘moral hazard problem.’ 
Nobel Prize-winning economist, Paul Krugman, defines ‘moral hazard’ as, 
“any situation in which one person makes the decision about how much risk 
to take, while someone else bears the cost of things going badly.”10 As Peter 
                                                     
10 See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND 
THE CRISIS OF 2008 63 (W.W. Norton Co. Ltd. 2009). See also, Definition 
of ‘Moral Hazard’, ECON. TIMES, 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/moral-haz 
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Molk, explains, “insurance brings the potential for perverse increases in risk 
levels and losses….”11 
Exposing the problem also points to a solution. Unintentional 
underinsurance can be resolved by rejoining risk and responsibility, which 
can be achieved without constraining the business flexibility or viability of 
insurers. 
This Article will unwind the confluence of misplaced incentives, 
software, expectations, regulation, and legal interpretation that all cohere to 
create pervasive, unwitting underinsurance in the United States. Part I of this 
Article documents and roughly quantifies what is intuitively understood but 
hard to confirm – that underinsurance is pervasive in the United States. Part 
II isolates the prevalence of homeowners unintentionally underinsuring. Part 
III describes the cost estimating tools used by insurers, and the human factors 
that intersect with those tools result in inadequate replacement cost 
estimates. Part IV collects anecdotal data to bolster or undermine the 
theoretical predictions of Parts I-III. Part V describes the mechanisms of 
allocation of risk from underinsurance. Part VI describes how unwitting 
underinsurance is a moral hazard-like problem. Finally, Part VII suggests 
reform – allowing insurers to calculate coverage limits however an insurer 
wishes, but making the insurer bear the cost of error. 
I. COVERAGE LIMITS ARE PERVASIVELY INADEQUATE TO 
REPLACE A LOST HOME 
In 2007, Marshall & Swift/Boeckh (“MSB”), the company that at 
that time manufactured the industry standard software insurers used to 
calculate insurance coverage limits, reported that for the years it studied, 
roughly 60% of American homeowners were underinsured by roughly 20-
25%.12 This was not a description of neighborhoods after a flood or fire but 
rather a snapshot of the entirety of the housing stock in the United States. 
                                                     
ard; Tejvan Pettinger, Moral Hazard, ECON. HELP (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.eco 
nomicshelp.org/blog/105/economics/what-is-moral-hazard/. (“Examples of 
moral hazard include: Comprehensive insurance policies decrease incentive 
to take care of your possessions…. Governments promising to bail out loss-
making banks can encourage banks to take greater risks.”). 
11 Peter Molk, Playing with Fire? Testing Moral Hazard in Homeowners 
Insurance Valued Policies, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 347, 349 (2018). 
12 PETER M.WELLS, INSURING TO VALUE: MEETING A CRITICAL NEED 
46 (2d ed. 2007). 
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While the underlying data supporting that conclusion has never been 
disclosed, MSB has been cited for it even by insurers.13  
Indeed, empirical verification and quantification of underinsurance 
is elusive. Even general information about insurance – such as what 
insurance coverage a company offers – is hard to come by. The insurance 
industry is, to put it mildly, parsimonious with data.14 And when it comes to 
pervasive, inadequate, nominally ‘full’ insurance coverage, an insurer has 
little if any reason to gratuitously aggregate and publicly self-proffer 
potentially derogatory data. Nor does a regulator likely have the resources 
(or the necessary reasonable suspicion) to investigate potential systemic 
problems in response to a single, disgruntled homeowner complaining of a 
one-off underinsured loss claim.15  
Thus, until very recently, there was no reliable source to verify or 
contradict the MSB conclusions. But that has changed with the combination 
of a new study on flood insurance and a California Department of Insurance 
Market Conduct investigation that recently made its way into a public court 
file. It can be concluded with confidence that most American homeowners 
nominally have coverage limits described as adequate to fully replace a lost 
home, and most of the time that coverage is inadequate. Further, it appears 
the frequency of underinsurance may be closer to 80% than to 60%. 
A.          THE PREVALENCE OF NOMINALLY ‘FULL’ REPLACEMENT 
COVERAGE  
Professor Jay Feinman writes, “96 percent of homeowners carry 
insurance.”16 But not all homeowner insurance provides replacement 
coverage. A homeowner may have the option to purchase either “actual cash 
                                                     
13 Chubb, Homes, https://www2.chubb.com/us-en/individuals-families/ 
Homes.aspx (last visited March 12, 2018) (citing a “2013 survey by Marshall 
and Swift/Boeckh” which states that “an estimated 60% of homeowners do 
not have comprehensive protection.”). 
14 See Daniel Schwarcz, Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack 
of Transparency in Insurance Protection, 61 UCLA L. REV. 394, 413-53 
(2014). 
15 The matter is further complicated because several states have adopted 
an NAIC-recommended protocol that empowers state regulators to aggregate 
market data from insurers in exchange for a commitment that the data remain 
confidential. See generally Frederick C. Berry, Jr., Shining a Light on Insurer 
Misconduct, https://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/publications/shinnin 
g_a_light_on_insurer_misconduct_12_1_0.pdf. 
16 Feinman, supra note 3, at 122. 
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value” coverage (ACV) or “replacement cost value” coverage (RCV).17 And 
not all consumers purchasing RCV opt for ‘full’ coverage limits.  
All that said, likely most homeowners do buy RCV and a relatively 
small percentage of policyholders choose ‘less than full insurance coverage.’ 
In 2010 the trade magazine, Insurance Journal, reported that according to 
insurer-commissioned survey results, 71% of homeowners thought their 
homes were insured for the full cost to rebuild (and were willing to pay a 
higher premium to get that).18 In a 2017 study of homeowners required to 
purchase flood insurance, Professors Collier and Ragin found that given the 
choice between less than full, full, or more than full replacement cost 
coverage limits, only 20.45% of homeowners opted for less than full 
coverage limits.19 There is no published study reaching a materially different 
result for standard homeowner’s insurance. 
While the Collier and Ragin work focused on flood insurance rather 
than standard homeowner insurance, there are a variety of reasons to 
extrapolate the findings of the Collier and Ragin study to standard 
homeowner insurance. For the most part, standard homeowner insurance is 
required – if a home has a mortgage then it must have insurance protecting 
the lender.20 As a consequence, for roughly 70% of homes the required 
coverage will be for 80% or more of the mortgage.21 But when selecting 
                                                     
17 FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT PROVIDING 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE MARKET FOR NATURAL 
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 16 (Sept. 2015), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/nat 
ural%20Catastrophe%20Report.pdf; See generally Johnny Parker, 
Replacement Cost Coverage: A Legal Primer, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295 
(1999). 
18 Homeowners Coverage Knowledge Gap Wide Among Consumers, 
INS. J. (Aug. 24, 2010), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/20 
10/08/24/112704.htm. 
19 Benjamin L. Collier & Marc A. Ragin, The Influence of Sellers on 
Contract Choice: Evidence from Flood Insurance 6-8, 12, tbl.3 (Fox School 
of Business Research Paper No. 18-017, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=31 
62388. Usually flood insurance is optional. Standard homeowner insurance, 
by contrast, is required by any mortgage. But Collier and Ragin confined 
their study to homeowners who were required to purchase flood insurance. 
Id. at 6. 
20 Kenneth S. Klein, Following the Money – The Chaotic Kerfuffle When 
Insurance Proceeds Simultaneously are the Only Rebuild Funds and the 
Only Mortgage Collateral, 46 CAL. W. L. REV. 305, 308 (2009). 
21 According to the 2015 Housing Survey, of the 56,337,000 owner-
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coverage limits, standard homeowner insurance is cheap. For example in 
2015, the average premium for homeowner insurance in the United States 
was $1,168,22 while the average premium to insure a single automobile was 
$1,009.23 Or put another way, the average annual cost of auto insurance for 
an American homeowner with two cars is 42% more than their annual cost 
of home insurance.24 Because standard insurance is comparatively cheap, 
there often may be little additional annual expense to a policyholder in 
purchasing 80% vs. ‘full’ RCV.25  
Further, there is a financial incentive for a homeowner to purchase 
full replacement insurance. Most property insurance policies contain a 
                                                     
occupied homes reporting how their purchase or construction was financed, 
all but 16,545,000 had a down payment of 20% or less. American Housing 
Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2015), https://www.census.gov/programs- 
surveys/ahs/data/interactive/ahstablecreator.html#?s_areas=a00000&s_year
=n2015&s_tableName=Table13&s_byGroup1=a1&s_byGroup2=a1&s_filt
erGroup1=t1&s_filterGroup2=g1&s_show=S. In other words, by the terms 
of their mortgages, slightly over 70% of all mortgaged homes were required, 
at the time of purchase or construction, to have insurance of at least 80% of 
the purchase or construction price. In 2015, over 60% of all owner-occupied 
homes with a mortgage had property insurance as part of the monthly 
mortgage payment. Id. 
22 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, 
DWELLING FIRE, HOMEOWNERS OWNER OCCUPIED, AND HOMEOWNER 
TENANT AND CONDOMINIUM/COOPERATIVE UNIT OWNER’S INSURANCE 
REPORT: DATA FOR 2015 at 34, tbl.4 (2017), 
http://www.naic.org/prod_serv/HMR-ZU-17.pdf. 
23 NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, AUTO INS. DATABASE REPORT 
2014/2015 at 27, tbl.5 (2017), http://www.naic.org/prod_serv/AUT-PB-
14.pdf.  
24 Accord INS. INFO. INST., 2016 Consumer Insurance Survey – 
Homeowner Insurance: Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices at 
3, Fig. 2 (Feb. 2017), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/pulse-
wp-020217-final.pdf (“...only 31 percent of Americans consider homeowner 
insurance to be a financial burden.”). 
25 Accord INS. INFO. INST., 2016 Consumer Insurance Survey – 
Homeowner Insurance: Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices at 
3, fig.2 (Feb. 2017), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/pulse-
wp-020217-final.pdf (“[O]nly 31 percent of Americans consider homeowner 
insurance to be a financial burden.”). 
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“coinsurance provision.”26 These provisions penalize a homeowner for less 
than 80% insured.27 
But perhaps more to the point, it bears recognizing what Collier and 
Ragin have been studying. Their goal has been to isolate what the influence 
of producers (any person or entity licensed to negotiate, solicit, or sell 
insurance28) of insurance and insurers are on the selection of coverage 
amounts.29 They chose the context of flood insurance sold to homeowners 
who are required to purchase it because the product is identical no matter 
what insurer offers it – in other words, the only variable is the seller.30 Collier 
and Ragin characterize their “main result” as showing “that insurers help 
select households’ flood insurance contracts.”31 Importantly, the insurers’ 
impact is not trivial, but rather the insurer “significantly affect[s]” the 
selected coverage amount.32  
The import of this finding is central to the question of the frequency 
of homeowners purchasing ‘full’ replacement coverage in their standard 
homeowner insurance. Producers – whether captive or independent – are 
compensated based on the percentage of premium written.33 Commissions 
                                                     
26 See ALLEN FIN. INS. GRP., Coinsurance Defined & Coinsurance 
Explained, https://www.eqgroup.com/coinsurance/ (last visited Sept. 10, 
2018). 
27 Id.; see also Yoong-Sin Lee, A Graphical Treatment of the 
Coinsurance Clause, 52 J. RISK & INS. 644 (1985); IRMI, Coinsurance 
Provision, https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-definitions/coinsurance-
provision (last visited Sept. 8, 2018); William K. Austin, Property 
Insurance: Coinsurance, IRMI (2012), https://www.irmi.com/articles/expert 
-commentary/property-insurance-coinsurance. 
28 What is an Insurance Producer?, CT Ins. Dept., www.ct.gov/cid/lib/ 
cid/anscomle.rtf (last visited Sept. 10, 2018).  
29 Collier & Ragin, supra note 19, at 1. 
30 Collier & Ragin, supra note 19, at 1. 
31 Collier & Ragin, supra note 19, at 4. 
32 Collier & Ragin, supra note 19, at 18, 23-25. 
33 Rick Mikolasek, How Much Do Insurance Agents Make?, THE TRUTH 
ABOUT INS. (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.thetruthaboutinsurance.com/how-
much-do-insurance-agents-make/; John Cain, How Much Do Insurance 
Agents Make, U.S. INS. AGENTS, https://usinsuranceagents.com/how-much-
do-insurance-agents-make; Become An Agent: Agent Costs & 
Compensation, STATE FARM, https://www.statefarm.com/careers/become-
an-agent/why-state-farm/cost-compensation (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
Accord E-mail from Madelyn Flannagan, Vice President, Agent Dev., Educ., 
& Research, Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of America, Inc., to 
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positively relate to the amount of coverage.34 More coverage leads to more 
premium which in turn leads to more commission. In this environment of 
incentives for full insurance and disincentives for less than full insurance, it 
is hard to articulate a reason to expect that the percent of ‘full’ RCV coverage 
limits for standard homeowner coverage is different than for required flood 
insurance. 
All of this suggests that roughly 80% of all homeowners have what 
they think is standard homeowner insurance coverage limits adequate to fully 
replace their home if it is lost. Indeed, Madelyn Flannagan – the Vice 
President, Agent Development, Education, and Research of the Independent 
Insurance Agents and Brokers of America, Inc. (the trade organization for 
independent insurance agents) – reports that “at least” 65%-85% of 
homeowners have full replacement coverage.35  
B.     THE PREVALENCE OF INADEQUATE REPLACEMENT COVERAGE 
Since the overwhelming majority of homeowners want, and are 
willing to pay for full insurance, one would expect that the overwhelming 
majority of homeowners have adequate coverage to rebuild in the instance 
of a total loss. Usually this does not seem like the case. 
United Policyholders (“UP”), a pre-eminent consumer advocacy 
group, has been tracking and working to solve the underinsurance problem 
since the 1991 Oakland/Berkeley firestorm.36 As part of the organization’s 
Roadmap to Recovery work in disaster areas it surveys survivors.37 Even 
allowing for some selection effect, the data describes profound 
underinsurance. Twenty-four months after the 2007 Southern California 
Fires, 66% of respondents reported they were underinsured by an average of 
                                                     
Ken Klein (Mar. 29, 2018) (on file with author). 
34 Collier & Ragin, supra note 19 at 4. 
35 E-mail from Madelyn Flannagan, Vice President, Agent Dev., Educ., 
& Research, Independent Insurance Agents and Brokers of America, Inc., to 
Ken Klein (Mar. 29, 2018) (on file with author). 
36 Our Mission, UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, https://www.uphelp.org/abou 
t/mission (last visited May 11, 2018). 
37Data Collection Surveys:  Roadmap to Recovery Surveys, UNITED 
POLICYHOLDERS, https://www.uphelp.org/roadmap-recovery-surveys (last 
visited Dec. 9, 2018). (“Our Purpose: To collect data from disaster survivors 
on insurance claims and recovery progress at various intervals; identify 
coverage issues, individual and common problems and solutions, assess the 
pace of recovery and the claims handling performance of the various insurers 
in the region.”). 
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$319,500.38 Twelve months after the 2010 San Bruno Gas Explosion/Fire, 
50% of respondents self-reported they were underinsured by an average of 
$200,000.39 Twelve months after the 2010 Fourmile Canyon Fire, 64% of 
respondents self-reported they were underinsured by an average of 
$200,000.40 Twelve months after the 2011 Central Texas Wildfire, 56% of 
respondents self-reported they were underinsured by an average of 
$110,000.41 One year after the 2012 Colorado High Park & Woodland 
Heights Wildfires, and Waldo Canyon Wildfire, respondents self-reported 
underinsurance respectively 54%, by an average of $101,000 and 27.2% by 
an average of $77,000.42 Six months after the 2013 Black Forest Fire, 38% 
of respondents self-reported they were underinsured by an average of 
$100,000.43 Six months after the 2015 Butte Fire, 65.22% of respondents 
self-reported they were underinsured.44 Six months after the 2015 Valley 
Fire, 53% of respondents self-reported they were underinsured by an average 
of $103,000.45 Six months after the 2017 North Bay fires 66% of respondents 
self-reported they were underinsured on the dwelling portion of their claim 
by an average of $317,000.46 
Other sources (reporting conclusions from undisclosed 
methodology) come to similar conclusions. A 2015 research paper by Swiss 
Re describes that in the US and Canada, properties valued at under $5 million 
are underinsured by an average of 38%.47 A Princeton University doctoral 
candidate found “the vast majority of interviewed 2003 fire survivors 
reported that the amount of compensation available to them under their 
[coverage] limited policies was much less than the cost required to 
rebuild.”48 The financial-focused media entity, CNBC, reports, “According 
to real estate data company CoreLogic, more than half of homeowner 
                                                     
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Butte Fire – 6 Month Survey, UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, 
http://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/attachments/buttefire_6mo_results
.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
45 UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, supra note 37. 
46North Bay Fires – 6 Month Survey Results, UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, 
https://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/attachments/north_bay_fires_-
_6_month_survey_results_v.2_4.26.18.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2018).  
47 Swiss Re, supra note 2, at 22. 
48 Hassani, supra fn. 2 at 149. 
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insurance policies have a maximum payout that is less than the cost to rebuild 
the home in the event of a catastrophic loss. Moreover, CoreLogic reports 
that 1 in 4 homes is protected with a homeowner policy that would cover less 
than 80 percent of the cost to replace the home.”49 
 This set of converging conclusions is suggestive but does not 
necessarily equate to rigorous study. A more rigorous study, however, has 
emerged in an administrative rulemaking file of the CDOI, filed in defense 
of a regulatory change in the state insurance code. 
In the wake of wildfires in Southern California in 2007, the CDOI 
studied the problem of underinsurance.50 The outgrowth of that work was the 
addition in 2011 of section 2695.183 to Title 10 of the California Code of 
Regulations (seeking to make replacement cost estimates more adequate). 
The insurance industry challenged the new regulation in court, with litigation 
that ultimately ended with a 2017 Opinion by the California Supreme 
Court.51 And buried in the Administrative Rulemaking File that the CDOI 
filed with the trial court is the market conduct study the CDOI performed on 
the prevalence of underinsurance amongst homeowners generally as well as 
amongst homeowners who had purchased “extended coverage.”52 
                                                     
49 Carla Fried, Recent Disasters are a Wake-Up Call to Check your 
Homeowners Insurance, CNBC (Sept. 5, 2017, 9:01 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/05/harvey-is-a-wake-up-call-to-check-
your-homeowners-insurance.html. 
50 Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, 386 P.3d 1188, 1191-93 (2017). 
51 Id. at 1194-95. 
52 Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal. App. 4th at 1027-30. The work was 
done by the Department of Insurance’s Market Conduct Division (“MCD”), 
and before being submitted to the court was reviewed by the Bureau Chief 
of the Field Rating and Underwriting Bureau. Id. MCD “commenced 
examinations of four insurers who together accounted for approximately 
50% of the market share in the residential property insurance line at the time” 
– Farmers, Allstate, State Farm, and Travelers. Id. The “examinations 
targeted the claim-handling practices related to total losses that resulted from 
the [2007 El Dorado, Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, San Diego, and 
Ventura] wildfires, and the underwriting practices related to insurance to 
value and the customer’s selection of coverage limits when purchasing and 
continuing the policy.” Id. “Similar processes surrounding the dwelling of 
replacement cost and the selection of Coverage A dwelling limits were 
observed in each of the four examinations.” Id. “In general, each insurer had 
its own replacement cost estimating tool and value generated by this tool and 
the value generated by this tool was considered (from the insurer’s 
perspective) to be the minimum Coverage A limit for which the policy could 
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The CDOI’s focus on extended coverage is important – “Extended 
coverage is based on a basic coverage amount that is equal to or greater than 
the estimated replacement cost. In fact, extended coverage cannot be 
provided unless the basic coverage is at least as great as the estimated 
replacement cost of the property.”53 In other words, underinsurance amongst 
homeowners with extended coverage is, by definition, unwitting 
underinsurance – homeowners who wanted full coverage, were willing to 
pay for full coverage, and indeed who thought they had more than full 
coverage.54  
The California Supreme Court later described the survey results, as 
well as some of its methodology: 
In 2008, the Department of Insurance’s market conduct division 
conducted an investigation of the four largest insurers—ones that 
together accounted for approximately half the market covering these 
losses. The survey revealed that for a majority of the policies 
examined, coverage limits matched what was indicated by the 
insurer’s own coverage calculator. But the recommended coverage 
nonetheless understated what was actually needed to rebuild the 
insured’s home over 80 percent of the time. Even when the 
homeowner had purchased extended replacement cost coverage, 57 
                                                     
be issued.” Id. “MCD staff examined a total of 188 policies during these 
examinations. In 126 of these cases, the Coverage A limit selected matched 
the figure produced by the insurer’s tool…of these 126 cases, the Coverage 
A limit was lower than the cost to rebuild following the loss in 102 cases.” 
Id. “When factoring in any extended replacement cost coverage that applied, 
72 continued to be underinsured for the total loss.” Id. “[T]he examinations 
revealed that regardless of the insurers’ stated positions, the policyholder is 
relying upon the insurer’s estimate…to select Coverage A limits in a 
significant number of cases.” Id.  
53 Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, No. B248622, 2014 WL 1576212 at 
*34 (Cal. App. 2d. Apr. 4, 2014) (Respondent’s Brief). 
54 See, e.g., State Farm’s answer in 2008 to why for one of its insureds it 
did nothing to confirm that the Coverage A limit was high enough to qualify 
the insured for extended replacement cost extensions that the insured had: 
“The underwriter did not need to confirm that the Coverage A limit was high 
enough…because the Coverage A amount selected by the insured met or 
exceeded the insurance-to-value estimate.” Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal. 
App. 4th at 698. 
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percent of these policies still underinsured their policyholders 
relative to the cost of rebuilding their homes.55 
All of this data is in harmony – roughly 80% of Americans do not 
have ‘full’ insurance, and most are short by a material amount. 
II.  THE PREVALENCE OF UNINTENDED, INADEQUATE FULL 
COVERAGE LIMITS 
Sometimes when insurance coverage limits are inadequate to rebuild 
a home that is a homeowner’s intention. As reinsurer Swiss Re notes, 
“undervaluation of residential property…can be driven by homeowner… 
policy choice based on affordability rather than adequate coverage.”56 
Indeed, some economists theorize an economically rational actor’s ‘optimal’ 
amount of insurance coverage often may not be full insurance.57 This all 
raises the question of how a homeowner decides on coverage limits.  
Many homeowners do not devote much time or attention to 
purchasing or renewing homeowner’s insurance According to a survey by 
the Insurance Information Institute (“I.I.I.”), less than half of homeowner 
insurance policyholders comparison shop at all when their policy is up for 
                                                     
55 Jones, 2 Cal. 5th at 383. 
56 Swiss Re, supra fn. 2 at 22. 
57 See, e.g., Jan Mossin, Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 553 (1968). But see Eric J. Johnson, John Hershey, Jacqueline 
Meszaros, & Howard Kunruether, Framing, Probability Distortions, and 
Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 36 (1993) (“There is 
abundant evidence, although much of it is anecdotal, that consumers do not 
make these decisions rationally.”). See also Vernon L. Smith, Optimal 
Insurance Coverage, 76 J. POL. ECON. 68 (1968); George G. Szpiro, Optimal 
Insurance Coverage, 52 J. RISK & INS. 704 (1985); Artur Raviv, The Design 
of an Optimal Insurance Policy, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 84 (1979), reprinted 
in FOUNDATIONS OF INSURANCE ECONOMICS: READINGS IN ECONOMICS 
AND FINANCE 251, 261 (Georges Dionne & Scott E. Harrington, eds.) 
(Kluwer 1991) (“the Pareto optimal insurance contract involves a deductible 
and co- insurance of losses above the deductible.”). But see Christian Gollier, 
Optimal Insurance Design: What Can We Do With and Without Expected 
Utility? printed in GEORGES DIONNE, HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 97-115 
(Kluwer 2000) (arguing that if information is adequate and symmetrical, the 
optimal insurance for a risk adverse purchaser may be full insurance, 
depending upon various factors, such as the type of deductible). 
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renewal,58 and of those who do comparison shop, well over half do so either 
by phone or online59 (neither of which are processes conducive to the kind 
of detailed inquiry needed to properly determine coverage limits adequate to 
fully fund a rebuild of a home). Indeed, because for over 60% of homeowners 
with a mortgage,60 their insurance premium is a component of their mortgage 
payment, the price of insurance may be essentially invisible. 
And even for the engaged customer, there is little reason to expect a 
productive price comparison. According to the I.I.I., 70% of homeowner 
insurance – measured by premium – is directly written, meaning through 
captive agents, the internet, or other direct means.61 Directly written 
insurance does not generate a price comparison of two or more insurers.62 
 This all would suggest a lack of price sensitivity by purchasers of 
homeowner’s insurance. This is interesting, because academic research is 
inconsistent about whether property insurance customers are price elastic.63 
Yet one must ask whether resolving this inconsistency matters, since as a 
former insurance executive confirms, “Insurance companies believe their 
customers are extremely price sensitive, and for this reason are more likely 
to seek to reduce premium than increase coverage.”64  
                                                     
58 INS. INFO. INST., supra note 24, at 13. 
59 Id. 
60 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 21. 
61Background on: Buy Insurance: Evolving Distribution Channels INS. 
INFO. INST., (last visited Dec. 9, 2018), https://www.iii.org/article/backgroun 
d-on-buying-insurance. A report published by the Independent Insurance 
Agents & Brokers Association of America, Inc. places this figure at 55.7%. 
Indep. Ins. Agents & Brokers Ass’n of Am., Inc., 2017 Market Share Report 
at “Homeowners” Table, https://www.independentagent.com/Resources/Re 
earch/SiteAssets/MarketShareReport/default/2017-Market-Share-Final.pdf. 
62 Some confirmation that the difference between captive and 
independent agent matters is a study of the purchase of flood insurance that 
found the coverage behavior of agents differed depending upon whether the 
agent was a captive agent or an independent agent. Collier, supra note 19, at 
4, 31. 
63 Grace, supra note 25, at 362 Table 4; accord INS. SERV. OFFICE, 
Managing Catastrophe Risk 4 (1996) (“An insurer willing to pay the price 
of sufficient catastrophe insurance could have trouble competing for 
business.”). But see Justin Sydnor, (Over)insuring Modest Risks, 2.  AM. 
ECON. J. 179 (2010) (finding Americans are inefficiently risk averse and so 
pay more than they should for low deductibles). 
64 Email from Elliott Flood to Ken Klein (Mar. 9, 2018). (Explaining the 
related issue of policyholder behavior, Molk confirmed the primacy of belief 
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But generalized price elasticity does not necessarily equate to 
intended less than nominally ‘full’ RCV. While real or perceived price 
elasticity could result in less than full coverage limits to reduce premiums,65 
it also could manifest in higher deductibles to reduce premiums,66 aggressive 
comparison shopping between insurers, or some combination of these 
factors.67 
Stephan Young, Senior Vice President & General Counsel of the 
trade association, Insurance Brokers and Agents of the West, suggests that 
the answer is intentional understated replacement cost both by producers and 
their customers: 
Both insurers and homeowners have an economic incentive to 
underestimate replacement costs. Simply put, the lower the 
replacement cost valuation, the lower the premium. And the lower 
the premium, the more likely an insurer is to sell its policies in a 
highly competitive marketplace, and the more money a homeowner 
can save.68 
But that explanation falls flat when – as the CDOI found with 
frequency – insurance coverage is inadequate even with the purchase of 
extended coverage.  
In reality, most policyholders almost certainly are without reflection 
following the advice generated by a producer or insurer of what coverage 
limit is adequate to fully replace a home. Why? Because doing just that is 
the unanimous advice of anyone knowledgeable about buying insurance. 
                                                     
in explaining behavior). Molk, supra note 11, at 6-7. 
65 Swiss Re, supra note 2, at 21. 
66 Grace, supra note 25, at 378 (“[Explaining] that consumers tend to 
follow experts’ advice to increase their deductibles and use the premium 
savings to purchase additional coverage that offers a better value in terms of 
protection against risk”). But see Johnson, supra note 57, at 42 (“Consumers 
appear to dislike deductibles.”); Sydnor, supra note 63 (customers overpay 
for lower deductibles). 
67But see Benjamin Collier, Howard Kunreuther, Erwann Michel-
Kerjan, & Daniel Schwartz, Risk Preferences in Small and Large Stakes: 
Evidence from Insurance Contract Decisions, NBER Working Paper No. 
w23579 (July 17, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3003717 (examining risk 
preferences in flood insurance, policyholders have substantial risk aversion, 
strongly preferring low deductibles and high coverages). 
68 Administrative Rulemaking File for Cal. Code Regs., tit.10, § 
2695.183, supra note 4, at 1198. 
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State Departments of Insurance across the country advise homeowners to ask 
their insurer or agent for the amount of coverage necessary to replace a 
home.69 
                                                     
69 See, e.g. TEX. DEP’T OF INS., Homeowners Insurance (September 
2017), www.tdi.texas.gov/pubs/consumer/cb025.html (“Ask your insurance 
company if you aren’t sure how much it would cost to rebuild your home…. 
Consider whether your property coverage limits are high enough to replace 
your house…. You can increase property…coverages if you don’t think they 
are high enough.”); STATE OF WIS., OFFICE OF THE COMM’R OF INS., 
Frequently Asked Questions, Homeowner’s Insurance 2 (Jan. 2017), 
https://oci.wi.gov/Documents/Consumers/PI-232.pdf (“[a]mount should  
equal the cost of rebuilding your home in the event that it is destroyed…. 
Your agent will be able to assist you in determining the amount of insurance 
that is appropriate for your home…”); IND. DEP’T OF INS., Property 
Insurance, https://www.in.gov/iDOI/2573.html (“To adequately insure your 
dwelling, you must know its replacement value. If you aren’t sure of your 
home’s value, play it safe and get help from your agent.”); PENN. DEP’T OF 
INS., Insurance Facts for Pennsylvania Consumers, Your Guide to 
Homeowners Insurance 6-7, http://www.insurance.pa.gov/Coverage/Docum 
ents/homeowners.pdf (“It is important to insure your home to replacement 
cost value because under certain circumstances you may be subject to a 
recovery amount less than what it would cost you to restore your home to its 
pre-loss condition.… You should also check with your agent or insurance 
company at least once a year to make sure your policy provides adequate 
coverage.”); N.C DEP’T OF INS., A Consumer Guide to Homeowner’s 
Insurance 15 (2010), http://www.ncDOI.com/_Publications/Consumer%20 
Guide%20to%20Homeowners%20Insurance_CHO1.pdf (“You should also 
discuss your insurance needs with an insurance agent. It is this person’s job 
to help you choose the right type and amount of insurance.”); 
COMMONWEALTH OF VA., STATE CORP. COMM’N, Homeowners Insurance: 
Consumer’s Guide 15 (2011), https://www.scc.virginia.gov/boi/pubs/hoguid 
e.pdf (“The first step towards determining what policy limits you need is to 
determine what it would cost to replace your house. The best way to do this 
is to have an appraiser estimate how much it would cost to rebuild your home 
if it were totally destroyed and document his estimate in writing. However, 
appraisals are expensive, so you may want to rely on advice from your 
insurance agent. Most agents have charts and home replacement cost 
estimation procedures to help you determine how much insurance you need. 
If you are not sure of the replacement cost of your house, ask your agent for 
help.”). 
 
54 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 25 
 
The I.I.I. describes itself as “the leading independent source of 
objective information, insight, analysis and referral on insurance.”70 The I.I.I. 
website posted an article entitled, How much homeowner insurance do I 
need?, and describes, among other things that “… your insurer will provide 
a recommended coverage limit for the structure of your home….”71 In 
another informational document the I.I.I. generates for homeowners, it 
advises, “[t]he amount of insurance you buy should be based on rebuilding 
costs…. Your insurance agent or company representative generally can 
calculate rebuilding costs for you….”72 
The National Association of Mortgage Bankers (“NAMB”) 
describes itself as “…the voice of the mortgage industry representing the 
interests of mortgage professionals and homebuyers since 1973.”73 The 
NAMB’s Executive Director describes that in order to close a purchase of a 
mortgaged home, typically the anticipated insurer provides to the anticipated 
lender a binder that reflects the “proposed dwelling coverage which would 
include replacement cost of the home.”74 Indeed, the Executive Director of 
the NAMB reports that she “would presume that the insurer would inform 
the consumer regarding the maximum coverage that they would be able to 
purchase based on replacement cost.”75 
In testimony before the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners, Ron Papa, past President of the National Association of 
Public Insurance Adjusters, explained, “Many consumers believe having 
insurance equates to having insurance for everything and that is the way 
some in the industry seem to like it.”76 
                                                     
70 INS. INFO. INST., About Us, https://www.iii.org/about-us (last visited 
Feb. 20, 2018). It bears mention, however, that the membership of the Board 
of Directors of the I.I.I. is 100% comprised of representatives from insurers 
and reinsurers. INS. INFO. INST., 2018 Board of Directors, 
https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/2018_board_of_directors.pd
f (last visited Feb. 20, 2018). 
71 INS. INFO. INST., How Much Homeowners Insurance Do I Need?, 
https://www.iii.org/article/how-much-homeowners-insurance-do-you-need 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2018). 
72 INS. INFO. INST., Insurance for Your House and Personal Possessions: 
Deciding How Much You Need, https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/ 
pdf/possessions.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
73 NAT’L ASS’N OF MORTG. BROKERS, About NAMB, 
https://www.namb.org/about_namb.php. (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
74 E-mail from Valerie Saunders (Feb. 21, 2018) (on file with author). 
75 Id. 
76 Ronald J. Papa, Testimony of the National Association of Public 
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There are companies that build and sell tools directly to insurance 
companies for determining the cost to replace a particular property during 
underwriting. These companies generate the tools as well as extensive 
training videos and directions for agents as to how to use these tools. While 
a consumer could buy the tool, that is not these companies’ target customer. 
Their business model simply assumes it is the insurer who calculates 
replacement cost when coverage determinations are made in the course of 
selling or renewing insurance.77 
Finally, of course, there are the consumers themselves. They tell the 
same story repetitively – they relied on their agent to set coverage.78 As one 
                                                     
Insurance. Adjusters Before the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners Property. and Casualty Insurance. (C) Committee Public 
Hearing on Catastrophe Claims at 10, NAIC (Dec. 2, 2012), 
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_c_related_hearing_testimony_
docs.pdf?160. 
77 Verisk, 360Value, https://www.verisk.com/insurance/products/360val 
ue-overview/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2018) (“360Value helps property insurers 
meet evolving customer expectations, while maintaining rating integrity.”); 
CoreLogic, RCT Express: Risk Assessment and Valuation Platform, 
https://www.corelogic.com/products/rct-express.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 
2018) (“RCT Express delivers the reliable reconstruction cost estimating that 
carriers have come to rely on for their new business and renewal 
workflows.”). 
78 See, e.g., ASS’N. OF CAL. INS. COS., 235 Cal. App. 4th at 56 (“I ask 
about the $186,000 total if it was necessary for I was going to remodel my 
kitchen. He told me with replacement costs built into my policy I would be 
fine.”), 65 (“I had a conversation with my agent 3 months before the fires 
about the possibility of being under insured....”), 80 (“After the Cedar fire 
[sic] in San Diego I contacted my broker to increase my coverage.”), 100 
(“Given the fact that my Agent stated that we were fully covered, I felt we 
were indeed ‘in good hands’ and believed that, in the case of a total loss, we 
would indeed have enough to fully replace our lost home.”), 175-76 (“I 
contacted State Farm in the fall of 2004 and told Ms. Bowman that I was 
concerned about being underinsured in the aftermath of the Cedar Fire.... Ms. 
Bowman told me unequivocally that we had enough insurance coverage and 
were fully protected.... At one point she used the phrase ‘buckets of money’ 
to describe the protection that the State Farm policy provided.”), 200 (“In 
2003, after the Old Fire, I called Allstate to ask if my policy limits were 
adequate in the event of a total loss.... I was told they were.... I called Allstate 
again.... My policy limits were raised .... I was thoroughly reassured...that I 
had ‘more than enough coverage’....”), 562 (“My husband said the amount 
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homeowner wrote to the CDOI in 2008, “I assumed that the insurance agent 
was an expert in determining the cost to rebuild my home based on the fact 
that she is an insurance broker; insurance is her business in my 
community.”79  
Here is how the CDOI described essentially the same point in 
briefing to the California Supreme Court: 
[D]espite insurers’ attempts to place the responsibility to select 
appropriate coverage limits on homeowners, homeowners in fact 
relied on insurers’ estimates of replacement cost to determine the 
amount of coverage to buy, and, as a result of insurers’ failure to 
include all reasonable and necessary expenses in their estimates, a 
large number of homeowners were underinsured…. “[T]he insurers’ 
processes and tools for estimating replacement cost are inadequate 
for formulating a realistic dwelling rebuilding cost” and their use 
“result[s] in insureds who believe they are adequately covered for 
the full reconstruction cost of their dwelling….”80 
United Policyholders filed an amicus brief with the California 
Supreme Court, along with the neighborhood associations of two San Diego 
neighborhoods devastated by two separate wildfires, summarizing what all 
industry insiders have always known: 
The vast majority of underinsured homeowner followed an agent or 
insurer’s recommendations and purchased an amount of home 
insurance that was based on a replacement estimate provided by 
the agent or insurer. Insurance sales representatives routinely 
perform a replacement estimate calculation and provide it to the 
insured at the point of sale. They induce consumers to rely on their 
professional expertise and consumers do so. Insurance sales 
representatives advertise themselves as experts in protecting 
people’s assets. That expertise and the quality of the protection…is 
the essence of their sales pitch.81 
                                                     
seemed low, he offered to increase the insurance, and he questioned the 
amount several times. The agent represented that the amount was enough to 
replace the house.”). 
79 Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal. App. 4th at 723.  
80 Ass’n. Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, No-S226529, 2014 WL 508598 at *11 
(Cal. App. Feb. 5, 2014) (Appellant’s Opening Brief). 
81 Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, No. S226529 2014 WL 3428812 at 
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There simply is no real dispute from the interested parties on all sides 
– other than in a post natural disaster public relations or legal damage control 
context82 – that a homeowner buys homeowner insurance on the basis of a 
coverage recommendation given at the point of sale by the insurer or 
insurer’s producer.83 Indeed, in the files of the CDOI, insurers routinely 
acknowledge that at least historically, insurers or their producers were the 
ones that estimated coverage limits.84 
Of course, producers have at least two reasons to quote full coverage 
limits. First, producers are paid on commission, and presumably know the 
infrequency of customers price-shopping insurance. Second, intentionally 
mis-describing and understating the adequacy of coverage exposes the 
producer to liability.85 So, one would reasonably expect that in the majority 
of instances, producers want to quote full coverage at whatever number the 
producer actually thinks is ‘full’ RCV.86  
                                                     
*16-17 (Cal. App. July 10, 2014) (Amicus Brief of United Policyholders, 
Scripps Ranch Civic Association, Rancho Bernardo Community Council in 
Support of Defendant and Appellant) (emphasis in original). 
82 Klein, supra note 3, at 364-65. 
83 See, e.g., Hassani, supra note 2, at 151-72. 
84 See, e.g., Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal. App. 4th at 74, 146, 154, 
186, 196, 227, 323 (“The agent appears to have calculated coverage....”), 
371, 411, 414 (“agency calculated...dwelling coverage limit ....”), 464 (“The 
Coverage A limit was figured at policy inception. Over the years...I 
figured....”), 520 (“With the information provided by the insured I used the 
CAN replacement cost estimator to calculate the estimated coverage ....”), 
562, 584, 689 (“My agency did not calculate the Coverage A amount. We 
did, however, calculate an estimate ....”), 993-94. 
85 For an overview of the complex set of regulations concerning duties 
of producers, see UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, Links to Materials Produced in 
the Agents E&O Standard of Care Project which was Commissioned by the 
Big “I” Professional Liability Program and Swiss Re Corporate Solutions 
(October 2016), 
http://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/publications/listing_of_big_i_swis
s_re_agents_standard_of_care_inform ation.pdf. It bears noting that through 
the device of the insurable interest requirement, an insurer can limit the 
amount paid to the actual replacement value even if the coverage exceeds 
that amount. See Molk, supra note 11, at 360. 
86 In 2008, the trade magazine, National Underwriter Property & 
Casualty, asked its readers, “what producers and insurers should ethically do 
to have properties properly insured;” it summarized the answers it got as, 
“[V]ery few responding believed there was no ethical responsibility for 
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And yet this leads to a conundrum – if a policyholder is willing to 
buy ‘full’ coverage and a producer has a financial incentive to sell ‘full’ 
coverage then why is the estimated ‘full’ coverage so routinely low? 
III. HOW THE COST TO REBUILD A HOME IS ESTIMATED  
Why are RCV coverage limits pervasively and profoundly 
inadequate? The answer comes from knowing where the predicted ‘cost of 
full replacement’ number comes from. And the answer to that question is 
replacement cost estimating tools.87 To understand why coverage limits are 
ubiquitously low, one must understand the tools.88  
A. THE COVERAGE ESTIMATING TOOLS 
There are two companies – Verisk Analytics, Inc.89 and CoreLogic, 
Inc.90 – that dominate the market of creating and selling to insurers software 
                                                     
producers to offer advice as to insurance-to-value. On the other hand, no one 
claimed there was any legal duty to do so, either.” Peter R. Kensicki, Whose 
Fault is it When Properties are Underinsured?, NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. 
& CAS. (Apr. 27, 2008), https://www.propertycasualty360.com/2008/04/27/ 
whose-fault-is-it-when-properties-are-underinsured/. 
87 See, e.g., Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal. App. 4th at 464 (“The 
Coverage A limit was figured at policy inception. Over the years in talking 
with contractors, and seeing the typical replacement cost figures that the 
Farmers system (which uses Marshall-Swift) would give me, I figured ....”), 
520 (“With the information provided by the insured I used the CAN 
replacement cost estimator to calculate the estimated coverage ....”), 689 
(“My agency did not calculate the Coverage A amount. We did, however, 
calculate an estimate using the Marshall & Swift/Boeckh tool State Farm 
provided at the time.”). See also Id. at 1029 (“each insurer had its own 
replacement cost estimating tool.”). 
88 Hassani, supra note 2, at 33 (“valuation algorithms and methodologies 
have routinely failed to generate accurate home reconstruction costs ...”). 
89 Verisk began as the Insurance Services Office – the property and 
casualty insurer trade organization – but now describes itself as, among other 
things, “a leading data analytics provider serving customers in insurance ....” 
Verisk, Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 4 (Dec. 2, 2018). 
90 CoreLogic self-describes itself as a “leading property information, 
analytics and data-enabled services provider in North America ....” 
CoreLogic, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 3 (Feb. 24, 2017). According 
to CoreLogic, central to CoreLogic’s ability to compete with Verisk as a 
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to calculate appropriate homeowner insurance coverage limits. Between 
them, they capture close to the entirety of the market.91 A third company – 
e2Value – is a relatively recent market entrant trying to compete by doing 
something largely different.92 For residential underwriting, Verisk’s 
underwriting product is 360Value. CoreLogic’s underwriting product is 
RCT. e2Value’s underwriting product is Pronto (a later generation trade 
name of a sister-product, Mainstreet). The most straightforward way to 
describe the three coverage estimating tools is to detail what 360Value does 
and then to differentiate RCT and Pronto. 
1. 360Value 
Verisk describes 360Value as a tool for insurers – when 
underwriting new insurance or renewing existing coverage -- for determining 
the cost to rebuild a home: “From underwriting to policy renewal” 360Value 
provides a “replacement cost estimation system to generate reliable estimates 
                                                     
provider of tools for estimating rebuilding costs is that CoreLogic acquired 
Marshall & Swift/Boeckh in March of 2015. Id. at 79. MSB, which 
CoreLogic headlines as “the gold standard of building cost data,” is 
described by CoreLogic as having “80 years of experience ... ensuring users 
have the tools for a complete and defendable determination of value.” 
CoreLogic, Marshall & Swift: The Gold Standard of Building Cost Data, 
http://www.corelogic.com/solutions/marshall-swift.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 
2018). 
 91 E-mail from Guy Kopperud to Ken Klein (Mar. 22, 2018, 9:20 PST) 
(on file with author). Verisk says its decision analytics customers are “the 
majority of the P&C insurers in the U.S.” Verisk Analytics, Inc., Annual 
Report (Form 10-K) at 4 (Feb. 20, 2018). Accord Collier & Ragin, supra 
note 61, at 7 (“Out of the eight [insurers identifying] their replacement cost 
software, six currently use Marshall & Swift ...”). According to its co-
founder, e2Value’s market share as measured by percentage of insurer 
entities in the U.S. (~1500) is about a third, but as measured by written 
premium would not be nearly that. e2Value’s market share has a higher 
penetration in high-value insured properties. E-mail from Todd Rissel to Ken 
Klein (May 2, 2018). 
92 e2Value is a private company formed in 2000 by George Moore and 
Todd Rissel. Company, E2VALUE, http://e2value.com/coompany (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2018). On May 13, 2008, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office issued Patent No. 7,373,303 to Moore and Rissel for a 
method and system for “estimating building reconstruction costs.” U.S. 
Patent No. 7,373,303, at [21] (issued May 13, 2008). 
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for every property….”93 And per Verisk, a lot of insurers use it: “Insurers 
already use 360Value to conduct almost 50% of all property replacement 
cost estimates in the United States…. 360Value is becoming the most widely 
used reconstruction cost estimator in the United States.”94 For these 50% of 
all U.S. property replacement cost estimates, Verisk makes a promise: using 
360Value, there will be “no surprises for underwriters or policyholders in the 
event of a total loss.”95 
360Value seeks to deliver on Verisk’s promise by leveraging 
Verisk’s existing data and tools for claims adjusting. The data and tools 
primarily are those of Xactware Solutions, Inc. Xactware is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Verisk.96 Verisk represents that Xactware is “a leading supplier 
of estimation software for professionals involved in building repair and 
reconstruction.”97 360Value starts with Xactware’s database, and massages 
the numbers to account for some variables such as rising building costs over 
time98 and demand surge in the wake of natural disaster99, and thus derives 
an estimated cost to replace for purposes of underwriting at the time of 
selling insurance or revisiting coverage limits at the time of renewal. Or in 
the words of Verisk, 360Value is designed to “match the front end to the 
back end.”100 
But while 360Value utilizes a variety of data sources (the delineated 
data sources are “public records, global information system (GIS) data, 
existing underwriting and claims estimates, [and] regional modeling”),101 
fundamentally 360Value is reliant upon Xactware’s data and technology, 
which Verisk describes as, “The key to the accuracy and reliability of 360 
                                                     
93 VERISK, 360VALUE 3 (2016), https://www.verisk/com/siteassets/medi 
a/underwriting-v/resources/360value-overview.pdf. 
94 Id. at 2. This is a serious encroachment on the market share of MSB, 
which as recently as 2006 was described as having a monopoly position. 
Elliot Spagat, Insurance Calculator Questioned: Homeowners Discover 
Coverage Was Insufficient, WASH. POST, at G3 (July 24, 2004), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9509-2004Jul23.html?n 
oredirect=on. 
95 VERISK, supra note 93, at 8. 
96 VERISK, supra note 91, at 112.  
97 VERISK, supra note 91, at 5. 
98 VERISK, supra note 93, at 3. 
99 VERISK, 360Value Overview, https://www.verisk.com/insurance/prod 
ucts/360value-overview/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).  
100 VERISK, supra note 93, at 8. 
101 VERISK, supra note 93, at 5. 
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Value estimates….”102 That ‘data and technology’ set comes from claims 
adjusting – it is “Xactimate, Xactware’s industry-leading claims estimation 
solution.”103 That is an extensive set, because 360Value claims Xactimate is 
used by “80 percent of insurance repair contractors” and “22 of the top 25 
U.S. property insurers.”104 As Verisk brags, 360Value uses “true component-
based replacement cost estimates based on actual claims information…. This 
true component-based approach…is what sets 360Value apart from other 
cost-estimating tools.”105 
So, what is Xactimate? Xactimate is aptly described by an Xactimate 
Affiliate Trainer, Mark Whatley: 
Xactimate gives users access to pricing databases for 468 distinct 
markets throughout the United States and Canada. Xactware 
publishes and maintains these price lists for both structural repair and 
cleaning, updating them at least once per quarter. 
Each structural repair and cleaning database contains more than 
19,500 unit-cost line items. For each line item, Xactimate provides: 
• Labor costs 
• Labor productivity rates (for new construction and restoration) 
• Labor burden and overhead 
• Material costs 
• Equipment costs 
• Contents replacement cost value 
The Xactimate price lists seek to contemplate the costs to perform 
various activities within the confines of the restoration ecosystem. 
e.g., storage, contents packouts & restoration, mold remediation, 
water extraction, environmental testing, asbestos abatement, etc. 
In most regions, a new price list is generated monthly. This updated 
price list incorporates ~10 new line items and significant 
modifications to an additional ~30 line items. Traditionally, user 
feedback is the catalyst for the adoption of new line items and 
material updates.106 
                                                     
102 VERISK, supra note 93, at 3. 
103 VERISK, supra note 93, at 3. 
104 VERISK, supra note 93, at 8. 
105 VERISK, supra note 93, at 3. 
106 Mark Whatley, Xactimate: The History & The Future, ACTIONABLE 
INSIGHTS 2 (Apr. 2018), https://www.getinsights.org/xactimate-history-
future/. 
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To understand Xactimate, and in turn Xactware, and in turn 
360Value, it is of immense importance to understand precisely where the 
foundational price data comes from, because it is not simply a download of 
the prices charged by a big box construction supply store such as Home 
Depot or Lowe’s. Xactimate is the self-described “industry leading” tool for 
claims adjusting.107 And the raw data for the “industry leading” tool largely 
is the aggregated data from billions of line items from previously adjusted 
claims.108 
That, in a nutshell, is how 360Value works. Billions of lines of data 
are aggregated from millions of adjusted claims. That data is combined with 
localized retail price data as well as a database of construction contracts 
emerging from those claims negotiations. The claims data then is updated 
quarterly,109 monthly,110 or even more frequently as needed,111 and for 
purposes of 360Value is combined with weather and other predictive 
software to incorporate unusual risk factors.112 And this then all results in a 
tool that a producer can use to estimate rebuild costs in order to determine 
coverage limits and premium. Essentially, used properly, 360Value prices 
the hypothetical reconstruction of a house down to its nails and screws.113 
But that takes a lot of time. Time a producer may not have.114 
According to Verisk’s literature, “360Value can calculate residential 
building estimates with as little as the address, year built, and total finished 
square footage.”115 Additionally, “360Value gives you the option of selecting 
                                                     
107 VERISK, supra note 93, at 3. 
108 Whatley, supra note 104, at 13; XACTWARE, Pricing Data Services, 
https://www.xactware.com/en-us/resources/pricing-data-services/overview/ 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2018). For a great more detail on the Xactware approach 
to data analytics generating a price list, see XACTWARE, Pricing Research 
Methodology (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.xactware.com/globalassets/us/pdf/brochures/pricing-research-
methodology.pdf. 
109 VERISK, supra note 93, at 3. 
110 Whatley, supra note 106, at 2. 
111See California Wildfires – Xactware Support, XACTWARE, 
https://www. 
xactware.com/enus/support/california-wildfires/. 
112 VERISK, supra note 93, at 3-6. 
113  VERISK, supra note 93, at 3-6. 
114 Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 
2695.183, supra note 4, at 1217 (“Many producers generate hundreds of 
quotes per week.”). 
115 VERISK, supra note 93, at 3. 
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a quality grade for either the entire property or specific rooms….”116 An 
insurer can also simply enter an address and 360Value will pre-fill up to 65 
characteristics of a home.117 
2. RCT 
CoreLogic’s product is RCT (“RCT Express” as an ‘app’).118 As 
CoreLogic describes its product: 
We’ve spent the last eight decades perfecting our total component 
methodology. This unique estimating methodology researches 
building costs from the ground up, with unparalleled research into 
local labor, materials and equipment costs in more than 750 
independent regions. We research more than 100,000 construction 
line items; 90 labor trades; and construction crew sizes, productivity, 
soft costs and code variations to give you consistent and current cost 
information. We validate our estimates with local and national 
research, home surveys, contractor estimates, construction samples 
and insurance loss analysis. In addition, we get inputs from design 
firms, architects, universities and construction organizations.119 
We localize costs at the micro-economic level and score property 
characteristics for reliability based on age, completeness and 
accuracy with our proprietary algorithms. Then, we use those 
property characteristics to provide more accurate risk values to give 
you a deeper understanding of residential structural risk, building 
condition and contents.120 
Benefits include: One-step estimating and risk assessment.121 
RCT sounds a lot like 360Value, and in the largest sense – a price 
list, data base, component-based estimating system – it is. There is one 
significant difference, however. RCT is not primarily using claims adjusted 
                                                     
116 VERISK, supra note 93, at 3 
117 VERISK, supra note 93, at 5. 
118 See generally CoreLogic, supra note 77. 
119 Structural Risk and Valuation, CORELOGIC, https://www.corelogic.c 
om/solutions/structural-risk-andvaluation-solutions.aspx (last visited April 
2, 2018). 
120 Id. 
121 RCT Express, CORELOGIC, http://www.corelogic.com/downloadable 
-docs/rct-express.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
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contracts and prices in its data; rather, RCT primarily is using retail price 
data.122 
3. Pronto 
As alluded to above, in some ways Pronto is a horse of a different 
color. Pronto draws upon “public and private data sources” including the 
company’s “own deep data” “to ensure…property estimates are as accurate 
as possible.”123 
e2Value starts from a different premise than Verisk or CoreLogic. 
e2Value believes that the predominant drivers of replacement cost are where 
a house will be built and what the quality/prestige expectations of builders 
for that neighborhood are.124 Stated differently, the cost of building the same 
house in Flint, Michigan, in Detroit, Michigan, and in Grosse Pointe, 
Michigan will vastly differ even though all three builders have access to the 
same labor and materials markets. Pronto is based on algorithms that analyze 
data on the premise that this dimension is far more predictive of accurate 
costs than detailed component-based price lists.125  
Like 360Value and RCT, “Pronto allows…customers to access a 
comprehensive valuation report instantly, after inputting only the property’s 
address.”126 
B. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE COVERAGE ESTIMATING TOOLS 
360Value, RCT, and Pronto are very sophisticated tools for 
estimating replacement costs of homes when underwriting insurance, and yet 
unwitting underinsurance persists. Why does it happen? The short answer is 
that fundamentally it is impossible to precisely predict a future rebuild cost. 
The longer answer looks at the architecture of replacement cost estimating 
tools, and the human factors of the people using those tools. The software 
designs make understating of risk possible and the human factors make 
understating risk likely.  
                                                     
122 E-mail from Guy Kopperud to Ken Klein, Professor of L., Cal.W. 
Sch. of L. (Apr. 5, 2018). 
123 About Us, E2VALUE, http://e2Value.com/us/ (last visited Mar. 1, 
2018). 
124 Email from Todd Rissel to Ken Klein, Professor of L., Cal.W. Sch. 
of L. (Mar. 3, 2018). 
125 Id. 
126 e2Value, supra note 123. 
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But before detailing of these systemic and human factors, there is a 
caveat: As to any of these systemic or human factors, one could posit that 
they are unlikely or purely theoretical, or that the impact of them is small or 
not at all. But if all of these factors were of little influence then certainly 
extended replacement coverage creating a 25%, 50%, 100%, or even 150% 
fudge factor or buffer would be sufficient to prevent underinsurance, and yet 
time and again it is not.127 The CDOI’s market conduct examinations of 
insurers found that the tools used by insurers were “inadequate for 
formulating a realistic dwelling rebuilding cost.”128 In other words, the 
estimates often did not come close. 
1. Systemic Architecture of Replacement Cost Estimating 
a. shortcuts 
As described above, all three estimating tools – 360Value, RCT, and 
Pronto – allow estimating to be done with very little information, sometimes 
just a street address, or an address plus the age of home and its square 
footage. But in estimating, shortcuts are a problem. 
As two Assistant Vice-Presidents of Xactware describe, if the goal 
is accuracy: 
Estimates are calculated by entering all known property-specific 
building attributes…. The property-specific building attributes drive 
all system assumptions and the subsequent components used to 
calculate the estimate. The quantity and quality of this information 
will influence reliability of the estimate…. The more building 
attributes used, the more reliable the replacement-cost estimate.129 
For component-based programs (RCT and 360Value), 
“Replacement-cost estimators depend on the underlying labor and material 
component costs that serve as building blocks for the estimate. To ensure 
                                                     
127 Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 
2695.183, supra note 4, at 1027-30. 
128 Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 
2695.183, supra note 4, at 1030.  
129 Scott Amussen & Mike Fulton, A Balancing Act: Homeowners 
writers strive for underwriting efficiency without sacrificing reliable 
replacement-cost estimates, BEST’S REV. 1, 2 (Nov. 2010) 
https://www.xactware.com/globalassets/us/pdf/360value/bests-review-nov2 
010-property-attributes.pdf. 
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accuracy, these components must be comprehensive, accounting for all 
permutations and combinations of features possible in a given structure.”130 
The following language from the ‘303 patent (the patent underlying 
Pronto) is instructive: 
Attempts have been made to simplify the methodology for 
estimating construction costs. U.S. Pat. No. 5,546,564 to Horie 
proposes a construction cost estimating system in which a database 
of completed construction projects is maintained with cost data for 
each project and other data for sorting the projects for relevance to a 
particular proposed new project….  
This technique, however, is subject to substantial inaccuracy due to 
the effects of its simplifying assumptions. …there are a great many 
cost influences that will vary from project to project, thus making it 
impractical to assess the relevance of any given project to another.131 
But Pronto is not immune from the problem either. As Todd Rissel 
(one of the two founders of e2Value) describes, while Pronto strives for and 
claims to achieve accurate estimating within 2.5% of actual cost to replace, 
failure to put in the detail of a property as actually built – for example, 
whether the roof cover is clay tile vs. asphalt shingle – can cause 
discrepancies (per Rissel) of up to 15%.132 
What is odd and difficult to explain is that shortcuts seem to lead 
disproportionately to understating valuation. In the wake of the 2003 Cedar 
Fire, the allegation was made that the shortcut function in the MSB software 
led to dramatic underinsurance.133 The same seems to be the experience 
today with 360Value.134 And while of course it is difficult to draw too much 
from these data points because there is no reason to hear complaints when 
the estimate either is accurate or high, the natural experiments described 
                                                     
130 Id. 
131 U.S. Patent Application No. 10/013,428, Publication No. 
2008/0103991 A1 (published May 1, 2008) (George C. Moore & Todd 
Rissel, applicants). 
132 Email from Todd Rissel to Ken Klein dated March 2, 2018. 
133 See, e.g., Jeanette Steele, Coverage gap in rebuilding linked to cost 
calculators, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (Aug. 22, 2004), 
http://www.carehelp.org/files/News/20040822_Coverage_gap_in_rebuildin
g_linked_to_cost_calculators.pdf. 
134 See, e.g., Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial, Bivin v. United 
Services Automobile Association, No. SCV-261717 (Super. Ct. of the State 
of Cal. For the Cty. of Sonoma Dec. 21, 2017). 
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below suggest that in fact, shortcuts tend disproportionately to lead to low 
estimates.  
Finally, it bears noting that while the shortcut function presumably 
could be removed from the software, it is not.135 
b. timing 
As the Insurance Information Institute recognizes, “If the limits of 
your policy haven’t changed since you bought your home, then you’re 
probably underinsured.”136 There are at least two potential causes – in the 
absence of extraordinary events – of coverage adequacy deterioration even 
in a single policy year – inflating building costs and building code changes.  
Even in the absence of ordinary inflation “materials prices and labor 
rates change constantly.”137 Historically, the change is in only one direction 
– up. As Verisk explains about 360Value, “To incorporate the most current 
changes in reconstruction material and labor costs, the Xactware team 
updates reconstruction cost data quarterly.”138 Verisk then publishes every 
fiscal quarter a “360Value Quarterly Cost Update” on construction costs.139 
The Verisk library of quarterly reports begins with Q3 2011 (which reports 
on Q2 2011)140 and thus far runs through Q1 2018 (which does not give a 
quarterly figure for Q4 2017;141 the last reported quarterly figure thus far is 
for Q3 2017).142 For all but one of these 26 of these reported quarters, each 
                                                     
135 A company designing the software might hesitate to remove the 
shortcut feature for fear that it would be economically unsustainable for an 
insurer or producer to do full, detailed cost estimates. 
136 INS. INFO. INST., supra note, 72 at 4. 
137 Amussen & Fulton, supra note 129, at 1-2. 
138 VERISK, supra note 92, at 3. 
139 VERISK, 360Value Quarterly Cost Updates, https://www.verisk.com/ 
insurance/campaigns/360value-quarterly-cost-updates/, (last visited Mar. 7, 
2018). 
140 VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost 
Changes Q3 2011, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwriting-
v/resources/360value-quarterly/360value-cost-update-us-2011-q3.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
141 VERISK, 360Value Quarterly Cost Update Q1 2018, 
https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwriting-v/resources/360valu 
e-quarterly/q1_2018_usa.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
142 VERISK, 360Value Quarterly Cost Update Q4 2017, 
https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwriting-v/resources/360valu 
e-quarterly/360value_quarterly_cost_update_q4_2017.pdf (last visited Mar. 
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and every quarter, construction costs have increased. The one exception – 
Q1 2014 – costs are reported as “virtually unchanged.”143 Costs never fall. 
And annually, costs are reported as rising 1.09% in 2011,144 2.02% in 
2012,145 3% in 2013,146 4.3% in 2014,147 2.2% in 2015,148 2.4% in 2016,149 
and 5% in 2017.150 Put another way, for every year since 2012, the rate of 
construction cost increase has exceeded the annual rate of general 
inflation.151 As a consequence, the coverage limit to rebuild a home is fixed 
                                                     
7, 2018). 
143 VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost 
Changes Q2 2017, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwriting-
v/resources/360value-quarterly/360value_cost-update_q2_2014_usa.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
144 VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost 
Changes Q1 2012, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwriting-
v/resources/360value-quarterly/360value-cost-update-us-2012-q1.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
145 VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost 
Changes Q1 2013, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwriting-
v/resources/360value-quarterly/360value_cost_update_q1_2013_usa.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
146 VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost 
Changes Q1 2014, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwriting-
v/resources/360value-quarterly/360value_cost-update_q1_2014_usa.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
147 VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost 
Changes Q1 2015, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwriting-
v/resources/360value-quarterly/360value_cost-update_q1_2015_usa.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
148 VERISK, 360Value Overview of Property Reconstruction Cost 
Changes Q1 2016, https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwriting-
v/resources/360value-quarterly/360value-q1-2016_usa.pdf (last visited Mar. 
7, 2018). 
149 VERISK, 360Value Quarterly Cost Update Q1 2017, 
https://www.verisk.com/ 
siteassets/media/underwriting-v/resources/360value-quarterly/360value-q1-
2017_usa.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
150 VERISK, 360Value Quarterly Cost Update Q1 2018, 
https://www.verisk.com/siteassets/media/underwriting-v/resources/360valu 
e-quarterly/q1_2018_usa.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
151 Historical Inflation Rates: 1914-2018, US INFLATION CALCULATOR, 
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/historical-inflation-rates/ 
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for the entire coverage year, but the actual rebuild cost goes up every day of 
the coverage year.  
A similar problem arises with changing building codes. As I.I.I. 
explains, “In the event of damage, you may be required to rebuild your home 
to the new codes….”152 Changes to the building codes making construction 
costs rise are so ubiquitous, in fact, that the I.I.I. recommends a rider to 
insurance for these costs.153 
For both of these reasons – building codes and building costs – even 
within a single policy year and certainly over the span of several years, the 
accuracy and adequacy of estimated replacement cost erodes.  
Insurers could adjust annually for these factors. They often do not. 
c. predicting catastrophe 
Catastrophes raise costs. The mechanics of this are simple – the 
construction trades build to expected capacity, and a mass loss in the wake 
of a natural disaster causes a demand surge.154  
                                                     
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018); accord Whatley, supra note 106, at 2. 
152 INS. INFO. INST., supra note 71. See also John Caulfield, Are Building 
Codes Revised Too Often?, BUILDER MAGAZINE (Oct. 1, 2013), 
http://www.builderonline.com/building/code/are-building-codes-revised-to 
o-often_o (“In many states, building codes are reviewed and revised every 
three years.”). See also Do’s And Don’ts When Insuring Your Home,  
UNITED   POLICYHOLDERS   https://www.uphelp.org/pubs/dos-and-donts-
when-insuring-your-home (“Make sure your offers adequate coverage for 
building code upgrades. The safest bet is full building code upgrade 
coverage, which is available from companies such as Fireman’s Fund, 
Safeco, Chubb, and Allied. Most other insurers offer either an extra 10% for 
building coverage or a flat $25,000.”). See also Why You Need Building Code 
Upgrade Coverage, GALLI INSURANCE AGENCY, http://www.galliinsurance 
.com/why-you-need-building-code-upgrade-coverage/. 
153 Id. 
154 Amussen & Fulton, supra note 129, at 1–2 (“Many factors influence 
[rebuild] costs, including...demand surge following a catastrophe....”). See 
also Will multiple catastrophes  impact  costs?,   E2VALUE   (Nov. 22, 2017),   
http://e2value.com/blog/insurance/will-multiple-catastrophes-impact-costs/; 
Labor shortages still a concern for builders, E2VALUE (Dec. 5, 2017), 
http://e2value.com/blog/general-information/labor-shortages-still-a-concern 
-for-builders/; Michael Gannon, Hurricane Sandy Demand Surge Influences 
Replacement Cost Estimates in the Northeast, VERISK (Feb. 13, 2013), 
https://www.verisk.com/blog/hurricane-sandy-demand-surge-influences-
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Demand surge is a complex economic consequence to model, but 
accurately doing so is of immense importance to insurers.155 To simply 
illustrate the issue more concretely, consider concrete. The industry 
populates inventory, labor, and schedule capacity to anticipated normal 
construction demand supply – there are not trucks and workers and concrete 
just lying around waiting for the next hurricane or fire or flood. So, when 
those weather events do happen, demand spikes, and in turn prices spike 
too.156 
The insurance industry is well aware of the importance of tracking 
and understanding the potential impact of natural disasters.157 More to the 
point, however, is that Verisk, CoreLogic, and e2Value all recognize the 
importance of accounting for natural catastrophe and attendant demand surge 
in order to properly estimate needed coverage to rebuild a lost home.158 
                                                     
replacement-cost-estimates-in-the-northeast/. 
155 See David Döhrmann, Marc Gürtler & Martin Hibbeln, Insured Loss 
Inflation: How Natural Catastrophes Affect Reconstruction Costs, 84 J. RISK 
& INS. 851 (2017). 
156 E-mail from Sean Scott to Kenneth S. Klein, Professor of Law, Louis 
& Hermione Brown Professor in Preventative Law, (April 09, 2018, 19:15 
PST) (on file with author). (“To meet the demand, some contractors may 
bring in or construct their own ‘batch plants’, which are miniature concrete 
plants that can be set up on a small plot of ground to produce concrete for a 
tract of homes or larger construction projects. These are not cheap to set up 
or operate but are often used to help meet demand. Another example of 
demand surge wreaking havoc was when drywall was imported by the 
United States from China during the construction boom between 2004 and 
2007. This was spurred by a shortage of American-made drywall due to the 
rebuilding demand of nine hurricanes that hit Florida from 2004 to 2005, and 
widespread damage caused along the Gulf Coast by Hurricane Katrina in 
2005.... [I]t is safe to say that all construction related materials and labor are 
affected by disasters, especially in and around the immediate affected 
areas.”) And this assumes, of course, that there are architects and general 
contractors who are available, and that they do not have to depend upon 
unlicensed, pirate subs, and trades to do work. 
157 See, e.g., Background on: Wildfires, INS. INFO. INST., (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.iii.org/issue-update/background-on-wildfires; Arindam 
Samanta, Key Findings From the 2017 Verisk Wildfire Risk Analysis, 
VERISK (July 12, 2017), https://www.verisk.com/insurance/visualize/key-
findings-from-the-2017-verisk-wildfire-risk-analysis/?utm_source=Social& 
utm_medium=Twitter&utm_campaign=VeriskSM&utm_content=842017. 
158 See, e.g., VERISK, supra note 93, at 6 (“Because many of the data 
 
2018 MINDING THE PROTECTION GAP 71 
 
Improperly accounted for demand surge causes massive underinsurance in 
the event of total loss.  
d. feedback loops 
360Value and RCT are “component-based” estimating tools. The 
essence of component-based estimating is in its name – line item 
components. As Verisk asserts, 360Value “accounts for all labor and 
material costs down to the screws and nails.”159 Feedback loops create 
averages, and averages will often be low.  
Consider, for example, the approach of 360Value, which estimates 
by reference to contracts adjusted in the claims process.160 In claims 
                                                     
elements needed for replacement cost estimates are the same elements 
needed for catastrophe modeling, 360Value is ideally suited to capture the 
detailed, property-specific data needed for effective catastrophe analysis. 
The point in the underwriting process when replacement cost is reviewed 
may also be an ideal opportunity to check on catastrophe risk.”); Trish 
Hopkinson, Hurricanes Drive Demand Surge in Reconstruction Costs (Nov. 
7, 2017), https://www.verisk.com/insurance/visualize/hurricanes-drive-
demand-surge-in-reconstruction-costs/; Store-Specific Demand Surge from 
Severe Weather, VERISK, https://www.verisk.com/insurance/products/respo 
nd-weather-analytics-to-predict-demand/store-specific-demand-surge-algor 
ithms/ (last visited April 2, 2018); Anthony Hanson, What Demand Surge 
Might Look Like in This Year’s Hurricane Season, VERISK, (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://www.verisk.com/insurance/visualize/what-demand-surge-might-loo 
k-like-in-this-year-s-hurricane-season/; Will multiple catastrophes impact 
costs? E2VALUE, (Nov. 22, 2017), http://e2value.com/blog/insurance/will- 
multiple-catastrophes-impact-costs/; CoreLogic Introduces New Desktop 
Platform for Insurance Providers to Pinpoint Natural Hazard Risk and Tax 
Data, CORELOGIC, (Nov. 1, 2011), https://www.corelogic.com/news/corelo 
gic-introduces-new-desktop-platform-for-insurance-providers-to-pinpoint- 
natural-hazard-risk-and-tax-data.aspx; Assess Natural Hazard Risk n RCT 
Express, CORELOGIC, https://www.corelogic.com/products/natural-hazards-
rct-express.aspx (last visited April 2, 2018); Hazard HQ, CORELOGIC, 
https://www.corelogic.com/landing-pages/hazard-hq.aspx?WT.mc_id=crlg 
_180813_yVEsA (last visited Aug. 14, 2018). While all the software claim 
to account for demand surge, there is no disclosure of how this is done. 
159 VERISK, 360Value, https://www.verisk.com/insurance/products/360 
value-residential/ (last visited April 2, 2018). 
160 See Whatley, supra note 106, at 5 (“More than 400,000 estimates are 
returned to Xactware every day....”), 13 (“Xactware’s Pricing Data Service 
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adjusting Xactware functions as a cost containment tool.161 If functioning 
properly, Xactware will materially ‘contain’ line item prices. That, per force, 
depresses the price list used in underwriting estimating. 
As an illustration, assume a homeowner has lost their home and is 
trying to rebuild. They have a contractor who has made a detailed bid. One 
line-item of the bid is 1000 widgets. A widget is priced in the database price 
for $1.00. But the actual price of a widget is $1.05. The insurance adjuster 
will challenge the line item of any contractor bid that prices the 1000 widgets 
above $1000.  
Because the contractor is unlikely to complete the work at a loss, 
they have some choices: They can walk away; they can turn to the 
homeowner for the difference; they perhaps can find some other line item – 
let’s say 50 zoobles – that they have a source to get for under list price and 
thus make up the loss on the widgets; or they can negotiate to try to get more 
for widgets.162 In all likelihood, the contractor will do some combination of 
more than one of these strategies. 
But under any scenario, the contractor has an incentive to have the 
line item for the 1000 widgets be at or as close as possible to $1000.163 
                                                     
…reports cost information based upon actual prices and transactions 
(completed bids) that have occurred recently in the given market.”); 
Xactware, supra note 108, at 7 (“Xactware’s role is to report a market price 
based upon recent transactions that have occurred.”). 
161Whatley, supra note 106, at 3 (“[O]ver the last decade, there has been 
a substantial increase in the frequency with which independent and Staff 
Adjusters write their own estimates.... [T]his change in policy has likely had 
a significant impact as it relates to stagnant pricing within the Xactimate 
price lists.... Why? Those that are operating under the direction of...insurance 
executives are trained to...(B) Apply a carrier centric custom price list that is 
comprised of suppressed pricing and a limited number of items.... 
In…Scenario “B”, the custom carrier centric price list actually actively 
works to suppress reimbursement rates for policyholders.”), 4 (“Staff 
adjusters submitted 63.1 percent of estimates processed by XactAnalysis in 
2016.”). 
162 In the event that the contractor engages in negotiation, there is the 
additional problem of asymmetrical expertise and bargaining power between 
the contractor and the insurer. Id. at 8-10. 
163 The contractor views the adjuster as a volume buyer and so faces 
immense pressure to “give” in the negotiation. SEAN M. SCOTT, SECRETS OF 
THE INSURANCE GAME: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT PROPERTY 
DAMAGE CLAIMS 47-48 (Heritage 2017) (“…there are too many contractors 
out there who are willing to drop their pants to get on an approved vendor 
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Indeed, it may ultimately be exactly $1000 – the data base price.164  
Let’s assume that the adjuster ultimately agrees to a price of widgets 
at $1.01 a widget. That becomes the next real-time entry for a widget in the 
database. And the algorithm of the database will not simply adopt the most 
recent entry as controlling – it will incorporate the new entry with other 
entries, so the price now listed in the data base may move only somewhat up 
– let’s say it moves to $1.005 per widget. Remember – in our example the 
actual current price of a widget is $1.05.165  
The point here is simple. Feedback loops will average together all 
prices -- including actual prices, stale prices, and below-market prices -- thus 
creating the risk both of understating prices and price stagnation.166 And 
using Xactware in particular as the core of 360Value amplifies the problem 
because there also are many inevitable soft line item costs to actual 
reconstruction – such as supervisor and project management time – that 
adjusters “often claim they don’t pay for,”167 and each time that assertion 
succeeds it may yet further depress any 360Value estimate that relies in part 
on that adjusted contract. 
2. Human Factors Leading to Software Misuse 
Software with all of the above-described features and challenges will 
function no better than the people who use it. And in cost-estimating, that’s 
a problem. 
                                                     
program with an insurance company. Many become mesmerized with the 
idea that doing so will be the key to fame and fortune and a larger volume of 
work. This mindset is similar to the lure of gambling where you get a taste 
of winning a couple of hands, but in the end, the odds of beating the house 
are always stacked against you.”). 
164 See Whatley, supra note 106, at 3 (“It is incredibly easy for ... major 
insurance institutions to exercise their will against the boilerplate price list 
(either intentionally or unintentionally)…. Contractors are rarely taking the 
time to determine their own individual cost, and subsequently create a 
custom price list that reflects their unique cost of doing business.”). 
165 See Kabir Shaal, Job Estimating Programs, LINKEDIN, (April 23, 
2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/job-estimating-programs-kabir-shaa 
l/ (“The software providers are very, very clear on one thing: Their calculated 
pricelists are indicators, not absolute. They do not claim to offer the ‘right’ 
price.”).  
166 Whatley, supra note 106, at 3-5. 
167 Whatley, supra note 106, at 14. 
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a. point of sale incentives 
According to Verisk’s people, “Insurers strive for reliable estimates 
but are mindful of the time required to calculate them.”168 A Texas insurance 
agent candidly disagrees:  
One way an agent can keep the price down is aim low [sic] in valuing 
houses. The goal, they say, is to keep premiums down to keep 
customers from going to competitors, and sometimes even a few 
dollars can make a difference. Sadly, many agents are just plain lazy! 
Too lazy to gather all the necessary information to accurately 
determine the cost to rebuild a home.169 
Perhaps laziness is a real problem. But more likely it is simple 
economics. Only about five percent of homes change hands in any given 
year.170 Put another way, homeowner insurance is a relatively mature market 
– there may be little gain to investing time and effort into placing new 
business. Yet, correctly calculating coverage limits accurately takes time171 
– time that producers have little incentive to invest:  
Insurers face competitive pressures to underwrite policies, requiring 
companies to increase the speed and ease of doing business with 
agents and streamline underwriting…. This poses a challenge for 
insurers: How much data should be collected to ensure properties are 
adequately insured and policyholders are protected, while remaining 
sensitive to the time investment of the insurance representative and 
policyholder?172 
                                                     
168 Amussen & Fulton, supra note 129, at 1; accord Papa, supra note 76, 
at 10. 
169 Rahim Virani, Under-Insured? – Part 3, TEXAN INSURANCE (Jan. 23, 
2012), http://www.texaninsurance.com/client-service/blog/entryid/2860/un 
der-insured-part-3 (last visited Apr. 2, 2018); see also Jerry Ramsey & Brian 
Heffernan, Underinsurance: A Consumer Fraud, Not an Agent Error or 
Omission, UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, 8-10, http://uphelp.org/sites/default/fil 
es/underinsurancelaws.pdf. 
170 Klein, supra note 3, at 356.  
171 See generally Amussen & Fulton, supra note 129.  
172 Id. at 1-2; accord Tom Smith, The Value of Insurance-to-Value Often 
Overlooked, INS. J. (Feb. 20, 2006), https://www.insurancejournal.com/mag 
azines/mag-features/2006/02/20/67985.htm ([T]here often are not many 
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b. expertise 
Estimating accurately is technical173 – Xactimate, for example, has 
four levels of user certification describing a spectrum of proficiency.174 As 
an analogy, think of the difference between a competent store clerk 
deploying basic arithmetic to sum up a bill versus a mechanical engineer who 
has mastered higher level mathematics to make sure the bridge doesn’t fall. 
Both are doing math, but there’s a big difference in proficiency with 
complexity. Whatley describes the following example: Xactimate is 
excellent at assigning fair reimbursement for granite countertops, provided 
that the detail is given as to “the proper grade of granite and all of the other 
related costs are accounted for,” such as the work involved with light 
switches embedded in the back splash or the inset of the sink or the mitering 
of the corners.175 Lack of proficiency, lack of rigor, and lack of detail all 
cause the claims adjustment to be low.176  
There is no reason to expect that either RCT or Pronto, used 
correctly, is materially easier. Indeed, both CoreLogic and e2Value provide 
extensive resources to train insurance personnel to use their tools 
accurately.177  
Producers, even with training, may lack the expertise to properly use 
cost estimators. But proper training is of little value if the producer does not 
personally visit the property and do a several hour inspection.  
In the absence of a visual inspection by a producer with time and 
expertise, the adequacy of the estimate erodes. When getting estimated 
                                                     
incentives for agents and brokers to calculate accurate property and business 
interruption (BI) values. As higher insurance values can mean higher 
premiums, agents and brokers are obviously looking to keep premiums as 
low as possible for their clients, which can affect their assessment of ITV.”). 
173 See Amicus Brief of United Policyholders, et al., supra note 81, at 
*15. 
174 Whatley, supra note 106, at 8.  
175 Whatley, supra note 106, at 16-17. 
176 Whatley, supra note 106, at 9; Hassani, supra note 2, at 63-66. 
Insurers as well as producers support the notion that training is necessary to 
get estimation right. See, e.g., Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. 
CODE REGS., tit.10, § 2695.183, supra note 4, at 1129-30, 1147, 1156,1186, 
1198-99. 
177 See CORELOGIC, RCT Express: Platform Overview, 
https://www.corelogic.com/products/rct-express.aspx (touting online videos 
and materials, private training, and on-site training); E2VALUE, Help Center, 
https://evs.e2value.com/evs/est/InteractiveHelpAdmin/Glossary.aspx?; 
E2VALUE,  Online   University,  http://www.e2valueuniversity.com. 
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replacement cost quotes questions should be asked on a variety of matters 
such as are finishes above average or expensive; or is the exterior style 
Spanish Modern or California Ranch; or the angle of slope of one’s roof; or 
whether the slope of one’s land is mild or moderate. Often these questions 
are asked directly to the homeowner. These are judgment calls for which 
there is not always an objectively correct answer, and/or for which the 
homeowner is insufficiently knowledgeable to answer accurately. 
Differences in the answers to these questions, however, can profoundly 
change the estimated replacement cost. That is particularly troublesome 
because there is subtle psychological pressure on a homeowner to answer 
questions in a way that results in lower-priced insurance. 
c. renewal incentives 
All of the factors described above can cause the estimated 
replacement cost to be understated even in a single policy year. But the 
reality is that most insurance is in place as a renewed policy, not a new 
policy, and so the challenges of underinsurance exacerbate.  
For producers paid in commissions on premiums written, the lion’s 
share of the money to be made is on renewals, not on selling new policies. 
Renewals should be easy, because customers have inertia, and so are less 
price elastic.178 But a producer nonetheless may hesitate to cause that 
customer to wonder if the customer might be able to get the product cheaper 
-- and thus to price shop it – by getting a renewal notice significantly raising 
the premium.179  
Now for these purposes it does not matter if the customer is price 
elastic; all that matters is that the producer is concerned that the customer 
might be price elastic. This is sufficient to incentivize the producer to not 
refresh or revisit the estimate of replacement cost, because if the cost has 
gone up (and remember, as Verisk’s data documents, the cost always is going 
up), then the premium for the renewed policy will go up, and the producer 
                                                     
178 See Sydnor, supra note 63, at 184; accord Benjamin R. Handel & 
Jonathan T. Kolstad, Health Insurance for “Humans”: Information 
Frictions, Plan Choice, and Consumer Welfare, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2449 
(2015) (confirming the influence on hassle and inertia on insurance 
decisions). 
179 Caitlin Johnson, Most Homeowners Are Underinsured, CBS NEWS 
(Aug. 31, 2006, 11:44 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/most-
homeowners-are-underinsured/ (“In the competitive marketplace, the last 
thing an agent wants is for the customer to run down the street to a competitor 
because they got a quote for $50 a year less.”). 
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will be at risk of losing the customer (and the commission). So, whatever 
price stagnation exists at the outset, it will worsen over time. Every year that 
a policy renews without revisiting the estimated replacement cost of the 
dwelling, the worse underinsurance gets. 
A final observation bears noting about underwriting – all of this 
assumes internal insurance personnel are acting in good faith, yet in auto 
insurance there is at least one prominently reported example of an insurer 
quite intentionally setting up systems to increase its profits to the derogation 
of its policyholders.180 And in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, State Farm 
was found guilty of falsifying engineering reports in an attempt to evade 
coverage.181 This Article does not seek to account for this sort of ‘cheating,’ 
but is not blind to its possibility.182  
                                                     
180 See, e.g., Steven Gursten, Allstate Confesses to Using Computer 
Program to Reduce Settlements for Auto Accident Victims in Michigan, 
Michigan Auto Law (Mar. 24, 2011), https://www.michiganautolaw.com/ 
blog/2011/03/24/allstate-confesses-to-using-computer-program-to-reduce-
settlements-for-auto-accident-victims-in-michigan/. 
181 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. United States ex rel. Rigsby, 137 S. Ct. 
436, 441 (2016) (“Respondents Cori and Kerri Rigsby are former claims 
adjusters for one of petitioner’s contractors, E.A. Renfroe & Co. Together 
with other adjusters, they were responsible for visiting the damaged homes 
of petitioner’s customers to determine the extent to which a homeowner was 
entitled to an insurance payout. According to respondents, petitioner 
instructed them and other adjusters to misclassify wind damage as flood 
damage in order to shift petitioner’s insurance liability to the Government.”) 
and Associated Press, Jury Finds State Farm Committed Fraud, JACKSON 
FREE PRESS (Apr. 9, 2013, 10:46 A.M), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/ 
news/2013/apr/09/jury-finds-state-farm-committed-fraud/. 
182  See Whatley, supra note 106, at 3 (“It is incredibly easy for … major 
insurance institutions to exercise their will against the boilerplate price list 
(either intentionally or unintentionally).”), 8 (“Xactimate is a tool – a tool 
that can be used for good or evil.”), & 11 (“A paradigm shift occurred in 
1992 when Allstate and other major carriers hired McKinsey & Company to 
develop strategies for managing claim cost. McKinsey referred to the claims 
settlement process as a ‘zero-sum game’ - essentially the carrier and the 
policyholder are competing for the same resources. The idea that an 
Adjuster’s primary objective was to fairly distribute claims benefits was an 
archaic notion, and the McKinsey report advised that claims be settled on a 
take-it-or-litigate-it basis. As a result, Allstate moved from ‘Good Hands’ to 
‘Boxing Gloves.’”). 
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IV. TWO NATURAL EXPERIMENTS (COLLECTED ANECDOTES) ON 
ESTIMATING FULL REPLACEMENT COSTS 
What the foregoing all predicts is that a homeowner buying standard 
insurance will be quoted ‘full’ RCV coverage calculated through either 
360Value or RCT, and that the quoted coverage limit will be profoundly 
inadequate. To test this prediction, the Author ran two experiments on his 
own house – several major insurers were contacted seeking a quote for 
homeowner insurance on the house and the three estimating tools were run 
to see what replacement costs each tool generated.  
For context, here is a brief relevant history of the house: The house 
was built in 1979. The Author purchased the house in 1998. In October 2003, 
the house burned to the ground in the 2003 Cedar Fire. The house was rebuilt 
and re-occupied in November 2004 (the total rebuild cost was approximately 
$450,000). In the last five years the house had a roof leak – this was a covered 
claim. The house also had some drywall cracks – an inquiry was made to the 
insurer about whether repair work would be covered by insurance, an 
adjuster performed an inspection, and the insurer reported that this was not 
a covered event. 
A.    TEST 1 – QUOTING INSURANCE ON THE AUTHOR’S HOUSE 
One way to know how coverage limits are calculated, and what 
producers represent (or not) about the adequacy of coverage estimates, is to 
actually gather insurance premium quotes and estimates of adequate 
coverage. What follows is the results of doing just that on the Author’s 
house, contacting the author’s present insurer, an insurer the Author was 
transferred to in the course of a call, and otherwise the largest homeowner 
insurers in the United States as identified by the Insurance Information 
Institute (citing the data collected by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners).183 Here are the results (the identity of each insurer is 
masked in order to avoid any suggestion that this experiment is intended to 
be derogatory of a particular insurer): 
Insurer A: The estimate was done by filling out a form on-line. The 
website described it was estimating using 360Value. The estimate required 
input of details concerning the property taking approximately 15 minutes. 
Estimated Replacement Cost: $595,000.184 The written quote states, 
                                                     
183 INS. INFO. INST., FACT & STATISTICS: HOMEOWNER AND RENTERS 
INSURANCE, HOMEOWNER   INSURANCE   LOSSES   2011-2015, 
https://www.iii.org/table-archive/21296. 
184 E-mail from Insurer A to author (Mar. 22, 2018) (on file with author). 
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“Estimated replacement cost is the estimated dollar amount of what it will 
cost to rebuild your home today…. Please review the 360Value Report if you 
think you may have entered information in error…. You can then use the 
360Value Tool again to recalculate your estimated replacement cost.”185 By 
a follow-up email, in response to the question, “I want enough insurance to 
be confident that if my home was lost, I have enough coverage to rebuild it. 
Is this enough? If not then how much should that be?,” a new quote was sent 
estimating replacement cost at $607,050, and extensions of that coverage 
raising the total dwelling coverage to $789,165.186  
Insurer B (and Insurer C): The insurer has the applicant fill out a 
form online, and then place a follow-up call to the insurer. The form took 
about five minutes to complete. In the telephone call, the insurer said it was 
not writing at present (a moratorium) on the address because of wildfire risk. 
Per the insurer, the insurer “partners” with Insurer C and the insurer 
transferred the call to a representative of Insurer C. Insurer C quoted Full 
Replacement Coverage (described as binding), with an Estimated 
Replacement Cost of $582,000. The quote included a 50% extension of this 
replacement cost, if necessary. Also, in the conversation, the following 
exchange occurred: “Q: You are confident that this is sufficient coverage to 
rebuild our home should it burn down? A: Yes.”187 By email Insurer C gave 
an estimated replacement coverage limit (including a 50% extension) 
totaling $873,000, in response to the email inquiry: “I want enough insurance 
to be confident that if my home was lost, I had enough coverage to rebuild 
it. Is this enough? If not then how much should that be?”188 
Insurers D and G: Both had a moratorium on the address because of 
wildfire risk.189 
Insurer E (telephone quote): The agent said Insurer E likely wouldn’t 
differ much from the others because they all use the same software, and that 
if the applicant could stay with their current insurer (who wrote Guaranteed 
Replacement Coverage) then the applicant should. The agent said the 
replacement cost estimates the other insurers were quoting were “silly” 
low.190 
                                                     
185 Id. 
186 E-mail to author (Mar. 28, 2018) (on file with author). 
187 E-mail from insurer to Author (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with author); 
Telephone conversation with agent for insurer (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with 
author). 
188 E-mail from insurer to Author (Mar. 26, 2018) (on file with author). 
189 Telephone conversations with insurers D and G (Mar. 12, 2018) (on 
file with author). 
190 Telephone conversation with insurer E (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with 
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Insurer F (telephone quote): The agent said Insurer F uses 360Value, 
which Insurer F referred to as the ‘industry standard.’ Because of the Fireline 
code of 8 – insurance would require two policies, one from Insurer F and one 
from the California FAIR Plan, and for this reason recommended the 
applicant stay with their current insurer. Nonetheless the agent quoted Full 
Replacement Coverage (at $237 per square feet) with a 25% extension. The 
agent said they were “comfortable” this was adequate. The written quote 
(sent by email) explicitly references 360Value, but also says the policyholder 
should pick a different replacement coverage in order to “feel” they have 
enough. Estimated Replacement Cost: $512,000.191 
Insurer H (on-line and clarified through a transcribed on-line chat): 
The chat representative described Estimated Replacement Coverage was 
using 360Value. The chat representative also confirmed that if the website 
inputs were conservative, that this “essentially” guaranteed replacement 
coverage because the applicant would “have all the coverage [they] need.” 
Estimated Replacement Cost: $554,000.192 
Insurer I (on-line and by telephone): Insurer I writes through 
independent agents. The agent suggested that to have confidence that there 
was enough coverage to fully replace the home, there should be full 
replacement coverage plus a 200% extension.193 Ultimately, no coverage was 
quoted because of “claims history” in the previous three years. 
Insurer J (in-person and by telephone): This is the Author’s present 
insurer, through which the Author has Guaranteed Replacement Coverage. 
This has been the author’s insurer for 20 years, and this was the first and only 
in-person inspection (of approximately 15 minutes) of the home in 20 years, 
and the only inspection by any of the contacted insurers. The inspection was 
not prompted by this research but was coincidental.194 The estimate of 
replacement cost was done using software from “Marshall & 
Swift/Boeckh.”195 The estimated replacement cost from this inspection is 
                                                     
author). 
191 Telephone conversation with insurer E (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with 
author). 
192 E-mail from insurer H to author (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with author); 
Transcript of chat with insurer H (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with author). 
193 Telephone conversation with insurer I (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with 
author). 
194 Telephone conversation with insurer J (Mar. 12, 2018) (on file with 
author). 
195 Voicemail message from Allegra Christian (Mar. 21, 2018) (on file 
with author). 
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$672,000, and the policy has been renewed as guaranteed replacement 
coverage.196 
B.   TEST 2 – REPLACEMENT COST ESTIMATING THE AUTHOR’S 
HOUSE 
In the wake of the 2003 San Diego wildfires it was widely reported 
that with a disturbing frequency, shortcuts cut deeply low.197 But that was a 
forensic post hac explanation of “what happened.”  
To test what actually happens in cost estimating (and the possibility 
that a lot has changed in the intervening fifteen years), the Author of this 
Article sought to run all three estimating software programs on his own 
house. Here are the results: 
RCT: CoreLogic provided the Author with portal access to the 
software. Estimate using just the property address: Reconstruction cost 
without debris removal -- $565,017; with debris removal -- $587,235.198 
With input of detail by the homeowner, re-estimate done: Reconstruction 
cost without debris removal -- $658,045; with debris removal -- $683,834.199  
Pronto/Mainstreet: e2Value provided the Author with portal access 
to the software. Estimate using just the property address: Reconstruction cost 
without debris removal -- $646,000; with debris removal -- $678,000.200 
Changing just a few of the assumptions in order to reflect the property more 
accurately (input by the homeowner) – the style of the house and the 
materials used for roofing – changed the estimate to $810,000 and $850,000 
                                                     
196Id. 
197See, e.g., Elliot Spagat, Insurance calculator questioned, 
WASHINGTON POST (July 24, 2004), http://www.carehelp.org/files/News/20 
040711_Homeowners_haunted_by_underinsurance.pdf; Jospeh B. Treatser, 
Homeowners Come Up Short On Insurance, NEW YORK TIMES (Aug. 31, 
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/31/business/homeowners-come- 
up-short-on-insurance.html; Jeanette Steele, Coverage gap in rebuilding 
linked to cost calculators, SAN DIEGO TRIBUNE (Aug. 22, 2004), 
http://legacy.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/fires/20040822-9999-1n22in 
ssoft.html; Company drops insurance calculator amid criticism, BILLINGS 
GAZETTE (Nov. 18, 2004), http://billingsgazette.com/business/company-
dropsinsurance-calculator-amid-criticism/article_293fc05e-ad31-5001-afea 
-f5ca544a4c91.html. 
198 CoreLogic, Data entry report (on file with author). 
199 CoreLogic, Data entry report (on file with author). 
200 e2Value report (on file with author). 
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respectively.201 Changing the “quality of construction” from “above 
average/upgraded” to “expensive/custom” (again by the homeowner) 
changes the numbers to $902,000 and $947,000. 202 A Mainstreet estimate 
done using “Residential Full,” meaning inputting the most detail possible (by 
the homeowner) -- estimated replacement cost with debris removal: 
$1,134,000; without debris removal: $1,080,000. 203  
360Value: The quotes from Insurers A, F, and H all were explicitly 
based on homeowner input into 360Value. An expert on doing valuation 
using Verisk software was contacted and asked to do a valuation based on 
his in-person inspection. The expert responded that to generate a defensible, 
accurate valuation would require at least three separate visits (at an expense 
of $195 an hour) and about an additional $2,000 in costs for technology and 
support.204 The expert indicated that he would expect the resulting figure to 
be materially higher than an estimate applying a dozen or so parameters from 
the homeowner input into Verisk cost estimating software, which routinely 
omits components and understates components.205 
V. RISK ALLOCATION 
All of this adds up to pervasive, unintended, inadequate RCV 
coverage limits. As e2Value recognizes, “any discrepancy between 
estimated and actual replacement costs can translate into financial risk….”206 
The question then becomes, a risk to whom? 
A. THE CONTRACTUAL LANDSCAPE 
An insurance contract is, even from a theoretical economist’s point 
of view, an unusual contract. An economist would posit that in any contract, 
both sides bear or retain some risk.207 An insurance contract, however, 
literally is a contract buying and selling risk.208 So, an insurance contract 
                                                     
201 e2Value report (on file with author). 
202 e2Value report (on file with author). 
203 e2Value report (on file with author). 
204 July 11, 2018 email from Sean Scott to Ken Klein on file with author. 
205 July 13, 2018 email from Sean Scott to Ken Klein on file with author. 
206 e2Value, supra note 122. 
207 See Georges Dionne & Scott E. Harrington, An Introduction to 
Insurance Economics, FOUNDATIONS OF INSURANCE ECONOMICS: 
READINGS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 2 (Georges Dionne & Scott E. 
Harrington eds., 1992) (“Risk is seldom completely shifted in any market.”). 
208 See id. at 1-2 (“In the usual insurance example, risk averse individuals 
 
2018 MINDING THE PROTECTION GAP 83 
 
should quite explicitly spell out what risk each side bears or retains. If a 
homeowner buys what is represented as ‘full’ coverage, then that presents as 
an agreement that the only risk that the policyholder retains is the amount of 
the deductible. A policyholder may be oblivious either to a treacherous legal 
landscape or language within a lengthy and obtuse contract that seeks to 
reverse this intuitive understanding.209 
But even in insurance contracts representing that the insured has full 
RCV, there often is wiggle language. The CDOI provides a tool that allows 
a homeowner to see exemplar insurance policies from various insurers.210 
Using this tool, one can see that within the insurance agreement, “Farmers 
Smart Plan Home Policy California,” is the language: 
The Coverage A (Dwelling) stated limit is the most we will pay if 
your dwelling sustains a loss. The actual cost to replace the dwelling 
at the time of loss may be different. We do not guarantee that the 
stated limit represents the actual cost to replace the dwelling.211 
There are no similar clauses in posted insurance policies from other 
major home insurers. But similar language is quoted from an Allstate policy 
in a complaint file of the CDOI.212 
And from occasional litigation files it is apparent that there are 
clauses that are not seen on the CDOI web site, because rather than reside in 
base insurance policies, they reside in renewal notices. In Everett v. State 
Farm Gen. Ins. Co.,213 for example, the court quoted a clause that State Farm 
included with its insurance renewal notice: 
                                                     
confronted with risk are willing to pay a fixed price to a less risk averse or 
more diversified insurer who offers to bear the risk at that price.”). 
209 See also Klein, supra note 3, at 373-76 (discussing the special 
challenges of the often-obtuse language of insurance agreements). 
210 California Dept. Ins., Homeowners Coverage Comparison Tool, 
https://interactive.web.insurance.ca.gov/apex/f?p=143:16:0::NO(last visited 
April 2, 2018). 
211 Farmers Insurance, Farmers Smart Plan Home Policy California at 
5. 
212 Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 
2695.183, supra note 4, at 163, 378-79 (“Allstate’s estimated replacement 
cost...is...only an estimate.... The decision regarding the limit applicable to 
Coverage A...is your decision to make....”). 
213 Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 4th 649, 653 
(2008). 
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The State Farm replacement cost is an estimate replacement cost 
based on general information about your home. It is developed from 
models that use cost of construction materials and rates for homes 
like homes in the area. The actual cost to replace your home may be 
significantly different. State Farm does not guarantee that this figure 
will represent the actual cost to replace your home. You are 
responsible for selecting the appropriate amount of coverage and you 
may obtain an appraisal or contractor estimate which State Farm will 
consider and accept, if reasonable. Higher coverage amounts may be 
selected and will result in higher premiums.214 
Additionally, a Complaint filed in California attached as an exhibit 
a form USAA sent to its insured at time of renewal stating: 
Our mission at USAA is to help protect your financial security. One 
way we do this is by helping you determine if you’re adequately 
covered in the event of a loss. We can calculate the minimum 
rebuilding cost of your home based on your home characteristics, but 
only you can decide if this is enough coverage.215 
There is no known compilation of renewal notice language (as 
opposed to base policies). It may be that variations of this contractual text 
are very prevalent in the industry, but primarily only in renewal notices. But 
that is speculation. What can be said with clarity is that just these four 
companies – Farmers, State Farm, Allstate, and USAA – measured by direct 
premium, represent 39.77% of all homeowner multi-peril insurance written 
in 2016.216  
There also are ‘meeting of the minds’ challenges. No matter how 
clearly these clauses are written, there is some likelihood that policyholders 
are unaware of them. As one author of an insurance law treatise describes, 
“an insured relies not upon the text of the policies but upon the general 
description of the coverage provided by the insurer and its agents.”217 The 
                                                     
214 Id. at 816. Nearly identical language is found in a 2004 State Farm 
estimate now lodged in the public record. See Administrative Rulemaking 
File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 2695.183, supra note 4, at 624. Accord 
id. at vol. III, p. 799. 
215 Exh. A to Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, supra note 134. 
216 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2016 Market 
Share Reports for Property/Casualty Groups and Companies by State and 
Countrywide, 139 (2017), http://www.naic.org/prod_serv/MSR-PB-17.pdf. 
217 ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW §32[b] 
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insurance industry self-describes that homeowner are “fuzzy on the details” 
of their insurance policies.218 In insurance-commissioned surveys, the point 
is confirmed -- according to “the results of a survey by Zogby International 
for MetLife Auto & Home,” “[m]ore than two thirds (71 percent) of those 
surveyed believe insurance pays for the full cost to rebuild their property in 
the event of a major loss, such as a fire or other natural disaster.”219  
And then there are the possible parol evidence problems. As 
referenced earlier, State Departments of Insurance across the country advise 
homeowners to ask their insurer or agent for the amount of coverage 
necessary to replace a home.220 Similarly, the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners advises consumers, “Your insurance agent usually 
will help you decide how much dwelling coverage to buy when you get 
homeowners insurance,” adding, “Your coverage should equal the full 
replacement cost of your home.”221  
These parol conversations occur with an indeterminable frequency. 
The CDOI asserts it has sometimes been “flooded” with homeowners 
reporting agents/brokers told them they had adequate coverage,222 while the 
                                                     
(Mathew Bender, 2d ed. 1996); accord Thomas Holzheu & Ginger Turner, 
The Natural Catastrophe Protection Gap: Measurement, Root Causes and 
Ways of Addressing Underinsurance for Extreme Events, 43 GENEVA 
PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 37, 42 (2018). 
218 INS. INFO. INST., supra note 24, at 7. Accord Hassani, supra note 2, at 
109-10. 
219 Homeowner Coverage Knowledge Gap Wide Among Consumers, 
INSURANCE JOURNAL (Aug. 24, 2010), https://www.insurancejournal.com 
/news/national/2010/08/24/112704.htm. 
220 Texas Department of Insurance et al., supra note 69. 
221 National Association Insurance Commissioners, A Consumer’s Guide 
to Home Insurance, 4 (2010), www.naic.org/documents/consumer_guide_h 
ome.pdf. Accord Collier & Ragin, supra note 62, at 1, 3. 
222 Appellant’s Opening Brief, Ass’n. Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, 2 Cal. 5th 
376 (2017) (No. S226529) 2014 WL 508598, at *1; see also Appellant’s 
Opening Brief on the Merits, Ass’n. Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, 2 Cal. 5th 376 
(2017) (No. S226529) 2015 WL 6114253, at *10. For an example of such a 
homeowner assertion, see what one homeowner wrote to the CDOI on 
September 2009: “We had a conversation with our agent … just after we 
completed a major remodel of our home. … The meeting took place at our 
home and our policy limits were reset as a result. During this conversation I 
made it clear that one of the reasons we were doing this was to ensure we 
were not in the position of the Cedar Fire people that ended up short on 
insurance. When I asked [the agent] if the amount he was recommending 
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insurance industry calls those claims “hyperbole.”223 One example from the 
anecdotal work described above, however, may explain how these differing 
perceptions persist. In a transcribed chat, Insurer H – in response to the 
question, “Okay. I know you do not write Guaranteed Replacement 
Coverage (my old insurer did but I fear that I may no longer be able to renew 
in that form), but am I correct that if I do as you recommend then that is 
essentially what I have because I have all the coverage I need?” – answered: 
“Yes, that is correct.”224 Yet Insurer H – in a footnote to its written quote 
generated simultaneously with that transcribed chat – states: 
This represents an estimated minimum rebuilding cost…. Please 
keep this in mind when you determine sufficient coverage for your 
home. [Insurer H] cannot guarantee the rebuilding cost estimate will 
be sufficient in the event of a loss. Please remember it is your 
responsibility to…make sure your coverage is adequate to rebuild 
your home.”225  
In a telephone to call seeking to clarify this discrepancy, the insurer 
acknowledged that as to accurately estimating replacement cost, a 
homeowner is “not a builder, you’re not gonna [sic] know that;” reassured 
that the insurer’s estimates were “accurate over 90% of the time;” but noted 
the language was added to the written quote because it “was not a 
guarantee.”226 
Chubb Insurance’s website provides another example of how 
insureds and insurers might come away with differing perceptions. The 
website says, “Chubb’s in-house Risk Consultants can help determine the 
amount of coverage you need. …Using the information gathered during an 
in-home visit and incorporating the knowledge and experience Chubb has 
gained through thousands of interviews with building contractors each year, 
a Risk Consultant will estimate the replacement cost for your home.”227 Is 
that a representation that the homeowner can rely on the Chubb estimate, or 
is it not? 
                                                     
was sufficient to replace our house, he said yes.” Administrative Rulemaking 
File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 2695.183, supra note 4, at 906. 
223 Respondent’s Brief, supra note 53, at *4-5. 
224 Transcript of chat with insurer H, supra note 192. 
225 Transcript of chat with insurer H, supra note 192. 
226 Telephone conversation with insurer H (Apr. 5, 2018) (on file with 
author).  
227 Chubb, supra note 13. 
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Similarly, the CDOI’s Administrative Rulemaking File contains a 
document from 2004 where one insurance agency distributed to 
policyholders a ‘FAQ’ sheet that led with the question, “How do we know 
that the stated insurance amount is enough to cover our home or building?”, 
and answered, “The dwelling amount is based on a current estimate of the 
replacement cost of the structure. It is not necessary to insure the land, the 
market value of the property, or the loan amount.”228 The document is silent 
on whose estimate is referred to.229 
Based on compiling numerous anecdotal parol reports such as these, 
the CDOI survey concluded:  
In general, each insurer had its own replacement cost estimating tool 
and the value generated by this tool was considered (from the 
insurer’s perspective) to be the minimum Coverage A limit for which 
the policy could be issued. Each insurer stated that the insured was 
responsible for making the limit selection based on his or her 
knowledge regarding the home, but was able to make use of the 
insurer’s tool to assist with this selection. There were varying 
degrees of communication and disclosure to the insured regarding 
what the estimate generated by the insurer’s tool represented, and 
regarding the insured’s duty to determine the amount of coverage he 
or she determined to be appropriate.230 
Then there are timing issues. As one academic center studying 
insurance notes, “Insurance is the only product for which consumers do not 
know what they are buying before they buy it. Insurance companies almost 
never provide copies of policy language or complete summaries of policy 
terms to prospective policyholders.”231  
Nonetheless, insurers still sometimes blame the policyholder for 
underinsurance.232 Indeed, the first public comment offered in the 
“Homeowners Insurance Hearing” held by the CDOI in 2009 was: “In 
general, ACIC members believe that the responsibility for determining the 
                                                     
228 Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 
2695.183, supra note 4, at 329. 
229 Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 
2695.183, supra note 4, at 329. 
230 Id. at 1029. 
231 Rutgers Center for Risk and Responsibility, Essential Protections for 
Policyholders, 10 (2016), http://uphelp.org/sites/default/files/guides/epp_10 
-18-2016.pdf (last visited April 2, 2018). 
232 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 3, at 364-65. 
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level of coverage provided in a homeowners insurance policy must be a 
decision that rests with the insured.”233  
If one were to posit that the homeowner bears the primary 
responsibility for selecting adequate coverage limits, then the next question 
would be to ask precisely how the homeowner could discharge that 
responsibility? Because generally the homeowner does not actually have the 
knowledge or expertise to calculate the cost of rebuilding their home, and is 
almost never the one being asked to determine that cost.234 Much more 
typically, as one homeowner wrote after losing her home to fire in 2007: 
When my agent wrote our policy, he asked me only a few questions 
…. I answered each every [sic] question that he asked of me. The 
fact that some characteristics were not included is because I was not 
asked. Since I am not in the business of insuring a home’s 
replacement value, I had no idea what questions or what 
characteristics should be included.235  
                                                     
233 Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 
2695.183, supra note 4, at 424-26, 1114. Similarly, a document Farmers 
Insurance Group sent to insureds entitled, “Make sure you’re not under-
insured”, that says among other things: We want to help you choose the 
amount of coverage that is right for you.…The information we have on 
record about your home is important because with each renewal offer, we 
use it to calculate a reconstruction cost estimate. You can use the estimate as 
a guide to help you choose the amount of coverage you want for your home. 
If you don’t have enough coverage, you could be under-insured. If you don’t 
have enough coverage, you could be under-insured. And if your house were 
totally destroyed, that could mean being unable to pay for complete 
reconstruction.… The reconstruction cost estimate can serve as a guide, but 
it is your responsibility to choose the Coverage A limit that is right for you.… 
You may choose Coverage A limit higher than the estimate, or you have the 
option to reduce the limit to an amount equal to the estimate. 
234 See Appellant’s Opening Brief on the Merits, supra note 222, at *8 
(“The Senate Banking, Finance and Insurance Committee…noted that 
homeowner’ lack of knowledge about construction costs, and improperly 
trained insurance industry personnel estimating replacement costs, 
contributed to underinsurance. The Committee declared that it is “critical 
that initial policy limits be set accurately and updated regularly.”). Accord 
note 226 supra and accompanying text. See also note 220. 
235 Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 
2695.183, supra note 4, at 105. Accord id. at 218 (“Not being experts about 
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As another wrote: 
I lost my cabin in the 2007 Slide Fire. I an [sic] underinsured because 
State Farm not doing their job [sic]. They denied my claim, with 
some nebulous nonsense. According to them, they do not insure for 
an amount, just an estimate. I am suppose [sic] to know what and 
how to insure? I’m suppose [sic] to be the expert? Are they or are 
they not in the insurance business? Do they know or know what they 
are doing? They advertise that they are the professionals and behind 
you, but you couldn’t prove it my [sic] me after this past year.236 
Yet producers also lack the time or expertise. Producers simply use 
the cost estimators given to them, and often apply shortcuts (doomed to 
understate coverage) embedded and promoted in the software (and which the 
compensation structures incentivize the agents to apply).237 
There is little a homeowner can do to remedy this problem. Per I.I.I. 
literature written to homeowners, other than relying on an insurance agent, a 
homeowner could “call your local real estate agent [or] builders association 
….”238 This recommendation is incongruous with other advice from I.I.I. 
Real estate agents are experts on home values. The I.I.I. emphasizes that 
there is a difference between the price of a home and the cost to rebuild a 
home.239 Market value and replacement cost simply are distinct 
conceptually.240 It seems fantastical to suppose that a real estate agent would 
                                                     
either the cost of new home building or home insurance, we accepted the 
policy as written by USAA.”), at 723 (“My husband and I have no experience 
or expertise in any phase of construction of homes or costs and did not 
question the amounts [comprising the estimated replacement cost].”).  
236 Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 
2695.183, supra note 4, at 822. 
237 See infra sections III.B.1.a & III.B.2.a, fns. 33 & 34 and 
accompanying text. 
238 INS. INFO. INST., supra note 71. See also Barry Zalma, Uncovered: 
Who’s Responsible for Setting Policy Limits?, CLAIMS MAG., June 2017 at 
22, 23. 
239 INS. INFO. INST., supra note 72, at 2 (“The amount of insurance you 
buy should be based on rebuilding costs, not the price of your home. The 
cost of rebuilding your house may be higher (or lower) than the price you 
paid for it or the price you could sell it for today.”). 
240 See, e.g., Replacement Cost vs. Market Value, STATE FARM MUT. 
AUTOMOBILE INS. CO., https://www.statefarm.com/simple-insights/plannin 
g/replacement-cost-vs-market-value. (last visited Jan. 8, 2019); James 
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– in a context where there are potential legal liability consequences to error 
– estimate rebuild costs of a home. It simply is not their core competency or 
expertise. 
Builders similarly are a misfit to supporting a policyholder’s need to 
determine of adequate coverage. The entire business model of Verisk is that 
they can sell that expertise to, among others, building contractors because 
builders too lack the knowledge, inclination, or expertise.241 As one amici 
wrote to the California Supreme Court, “contractors are not in the business 
of providing free estimates for hypothetical construction projects.” And if 
they were, they likely would do it poorly.242 
The homeowner simply is not positioned to determine the adequacy 
of coverage. Nonetheless, the legal landscape often reaches a different 
conclusion. 
B. THE REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
One former state Deputy Director of Insurance suggests that state 
Insurance Commissioners have the power to collect the data necessary to 
address underinsurance, have collected the information, but largely have 
done nothing with it.243 
It is possible for insurance regulators to put a thumb on the scales of 
risk shifting. California regulators have done so. Effective June 27, 2011, the 
CDOI adopted a new regulation standardizing the components of an insurer’s 
replacement cost estimate.244 The regulation requires insurers write RCV 
                                                     
Siebers, Market Value vs. Replacement Cost, CORELOGIC 
https://www.corelogic.com/blog/2016/03/market-value-vs-replacement-
cost.aspx. 
241See, e.g., Xactware, Xactware Webcast.: Introducing Restoration 
Manager: Helping Contractors Get a Read on Their Business, 
https://www.xactware.com/en-us/resources/webcasts/upcoming-webcasts/ 
introducing-restoration-manager---helping-contractors-get-a-bead-on-their-
business/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2018); 360Value, supra note 93, at 8 
(“Xactimate...is used by...80 percent of insurance repair contractors”); 
Accord Appellant’s Reply Brief, Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal. App. 4th 
1009 (2015) (No. S226529) 2014 WL 3014611, at *8 (“A contractor can bill 
the homeowner for cost overruns during construction, but the homeowner 
cannot receive coverage over the limits of a replacement cost policy.”). 
242 Amicus Brief of United Policy Holders, supra note 81, at *16-17; 
Whatley, supra note 106, at 5, 7-8. 
243 Berry, supra note 15. 
244 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2695.183 (2011). 
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utilizing cost estimating to account for several delineated features of the 
insured home: 
(1) Cost of labor, building materials and supplies; 
(2) Overhead and profit; 
(3) Cost of demolition and debris removal; 
(4) Cost of permits and architect’s plans; and 
(5) Consideration of components and features of the insured structure, 
including at least the following: 
(A) Type of foundation;  
(B) Type of frame; 
(C) Roofing materials and type of roof; 
(D) Siding materials and type of siding; 
(E) Whether the structure is located on a slope; 
(F) The square footage of the living space; 
(G) Geographic location of property; 
(H) Number of stories and any nonstandard wall heights;  
(I) Materials used in, and generic types of, interior features and 
finishes, such as, where applicable, the type of heating and air 
conditioning system, walls, flooring, ceiling, fireplaces, 
kitchen, and bath(s);  
(J) Age of the structure or the year it was built; and  
(K) Size and type of attached garage.245 
Importantly, the regulation distinguishes between insurers and 
producers. One of the changes that insurance agents successfully lobbied for 
in the California regulations was to clarify that when producers were using 
tools that were provided to them by insurers, if the tools estimated in error, 
then that was on the insurer, not on the producer.246  
But California’s intervention by regulation may not be a panacea. 
Just as tobacco companies relied on the government-mandated health 
warnings on a package of cigarettes as a defense to a charge that smokers 
were not adequately warned, compliance with the insurance regulation might 
provide a defense to insurers if the resulting estimate is still too low.247 
                                                     
245 § 2695.183.  
246 Administrative Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 
2695.183, supra note 4, at 1489-96. 
247 See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 520-21 (1992). 
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C. THE LEGISLATIVE LANDSCAPE 
It is, of course, possible for a state to legislatively step into the 
underwriting landscape, rather than leaving the matter to courts or regulators. 
Fourteen states affirmatively prohibit the policyholder, an insurer, and/or an 
agent from knowingly agreeing to over-insure.248 For example, Minnesota 
law provides, “No company shall knowingly issue any policy upon property 
in this state for an amount which … exceeds the replacement cost of the 
buildings ….”249  
Colorado law provides that before issuance or renewal of full 
replacement cost homeowner insurance (defined as the dwelling limit is 
equal to or greater than the estimated replacement cost of the residence) the 
insurer shall make available at least ten percent extended replacement cost 
coverage.250 
Florida law provides, “prior to issuing a homeowner’s insurance 
policy, the insurer must offer … a policy or endorsement providing … 
replacement costs to the dwelling….”251 
Conversely, while it is an ever-changing landscape, roughly twenty 
states have valued policy laws requiring that in the event of a total loss an 
insurer must pay the coverage limit of the policy whether the actual 
replacement cost reaches (or exceeds) this value or not.252 
D. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL LANDSCAPE 
A comprehensive review of caselaw broadly addressing coverage 
adequacy in contract and tort law is beyond the scope of a subsection within 
an article.253 But there is a somewhat discrete set of published cases 
                                                     
248 ALASKA STAT. § 21.60.010 (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-5(6)(A) 
(West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10E-102 (West 2005); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 304.20-260 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65A.09 (West 
2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-13-5 (West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
44-603 (West 2010); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:36-5.19 (West 1994); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-43-5 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 742.200 
(West 2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-75-20 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-
7-801 (West 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.27.010 (West 2010); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-23-101 (West 2011). 
249 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65A.09(1) West (2005). 
250 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §10-4-1108(6)(a) (West 2013). 
251 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.7011 (West 2011). 
252 See Molk, supra note 11, at 362, 364, 386. 
253 See Joshua Fox, Comment, Softening the Short Shrift: Regulating 
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addressing the argument that coverage is ultimately the homeowner’s 
responsibility.254 
In Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co.,255 Ms. Everett – whose San 
Bernardino, California home initially was insured with a stated dwelling 
replacement cost but had guaranteed replacement (read: unlimited) coverage 
– had for several years had full replacement (read: limited) coverage 
annually renewed with notices reminding her it was “her responsibility to 
insure her home with adequate coverage.”256 After her home burned down in 
2003, she sued State Farm both in contract and tort alleging that even with a 
coverage limit extension she was underinsured.257 The appellate court 
affirmed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for State Farm, holding 
the policy had limited dwelling replacement coverage in clear and 
unambiguous language, “nothing in the record suggests that the original 
policy limits were insufficient,” and it was not State Farm’s duty to maintain 
adequate limits.258 
In Bryce v. Unitrin Preferred Ins. Co.,259 after a 2006 fire destroyed 
the Bryce’s home in Georgetown, Texas, the Bryces learned their 
‘replacement cost’ insurance was “grossly inadequate.”260 For several years, 
the Bryces had been involved in a series of conversations about coverage and 
policy renewal, beginning when the Bryces changed insurers and opted to 
keep the prior insurer’s coverage limits in place;261 of these most notably the 
agent recalled recommending the Bryces consult with a builder on 
determining replacement cost, while the Bryces recalled being told by the 
agent that the insurance was adequate.262 “After hearing the evidence, the 
jury returned a unanimous verdict that the Bryces’ negligence alone 
proximately caused their home to be underinsured.”263 The appellate court 
                                                     
Homeowners Insurance Limits as Causes of Underinsurance, 46 CAL. W. L. 
REV. 369 (2010) (providing a broad summary of the case law). 
254 Hassani, supra note 2, at 81-83; accord Ramsay & Heffernan, supra 
note 169, at 2-4. 
255 Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 4th 649 (2008). 
256 Id. at 652-53. 
257 Id. at 653-54. 
258 Id. at 657-61. 
259 Bryce v. Unitrin Preferred Ins. Co., No. 03-08-00670-CV, 2010 WL 
01253579 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2010). 
260 Id. at *1. 
261 Id. at *1-*3. 
262 Id. at *2-*3. 
263 Id. at *4. 
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affirmed.264 The appellate court noted Texas law, “does not, as the Bryces 
contend, create a duty on the part of either an agent or an insurance carrier 
to monitor an insured’s policy in order to ensure that the requested coverage 
is adequate.”265 Further, an insurer inspection of a home – per the Texas court 
– is for the benefit of the insurer, not the insured.266 
In Furtak v. Moffett,267 after a 1992 fire destroyed the Furtaks’ 
Highland Park, Illinois home, the Furtaks found themselves with insurance 
of roughly 1/6th the appraised value of their home.268 The Furtaks claimed 
that in 1975 when they purchased the home, they requested insurance agent 
“Moffett provide insurance that would fully cover their home against all loss, 
and Moffett offered them a policy that would fully cover their home even in 
the worst case scenario.”269 There was no home inspection and there was a 
notation that the home was being completely renovated and remodeled.270 
The insurance was renewed for the next 15 years, without inquiry from the 
agent or notice from the homeowner about the outcome of the renovations 
and remodeling.271 At trial, the Furtaks conceded that under Illinois law it 
was their burden to know the contents of their policy, to draw any 
discrepancies to the insurer’s attention, and that the insurer had no duty to 
review the adequacy of coverage; nonetheless, the Furtaks contended that 
the insurer – Farmers – had voluntarily undertaken a duty to determine 
adequacy of coverage of its insureds through a series of actions, but had 
failed to do so for the Furtaks.272 The appellate court held, “The fact that 
defendants instituted procedures to determine whether their insureds were 
underinsured and Farmers encouraged their agents to inform their insureds 
that they should evaluate the adequacy of their coverage does not impose 
upon them a duty to warn plaintiffs of their inadequate insurance.”273 As to 
any breach of oral contract claim, the appellate court rejected it as contrary 
to the Illinois statute of frauds.274 
                                                     
264 Id. at *10. 
265 Id. at *5. 
266 Id. at *7-*8. 
267 Furtak v. Moffett, 671 N.E. 2d 827 (Ill. 1996). 
268 Id. at 829. 
269 Id. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 830. 
274 Id. 
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In Schanz v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 275 a 1979 fire completely 
destroyed the plaintiffs’ building in Saginaw, Michigan.276 The building 
owners and their insurance agent agreed that an insurer – Aetna – appraised 
the building and set the replacement cost of the building.277 The building 
owners and their insurance agent then used that appraisal to place insurance 
with the defendant insurer because it came at a cheaper premium than Aetna 
quoted.278 The defendant insurer then did their own inspection and estimate 
– a higher replacement coverage was estimated – and plaintiffs insured to 
that new figure.279 After the fire, the true replacement cost was over double 
any figure any insurer estimated.280 On these rather dramatic facts, the 
plaintiffs sued asserting negligence, they won at trial, and the appellate court 
affirmed.281 The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the 
defendant – having voluntarily undertaken to inspect the property knowing 
the plaintiffs would rely on the findings of that inspection – negligently 
caused the property to be underinsured.282 In contrast to Schanz, in Chemical 
Technology, Inc. v. Berkshire Agency, Inc.,283 the court confirmed that in 
Michigan, unless something changes the usual situation of agents taking 
orders from customers, generally, “insurance agents have no duty to advise 
the inured regarding the adequacy of insurance coverage.”284 
In Peterson v. Big Bend Ins. Agency, Inc.,285 when the Petersons 
purchased homeowner insurance they “explained their desire to have their 
home insured for the full replacement value.”286 “The Petersons indicated 
they did not know what the cost of this coverage would be or how such a 
figure would be determined.”287 Their insurance agent used software 
identified as the “Boeckh Cost Guide” (per the court, “this software, or a 
                                                     
275 Schanz v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 418 N.W.2d 478 (Mich. 1988). 
276 Id. at 479. 
277 Id. at 480. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. 
280 Id. 
281 Id. at 481, 484. 
282 Id. at 482-83. 
283 Chemical Technology, Inc. v. Berkshire Agency, Inc., No. 326394, 
2016 WL 4008455, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. July 26, 2016). 
284 Id. at *2 (quoting Harts v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 597 N.W.2d 47, 50 
(1999)). 
285 Peterson v. Big Bend Ins. Agency, Inc., 202 P.3d 372 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2009). 
286 Id. at 374. 
287 Id. at 375. 
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similar program, is a standard in the insurance industry”) to estimate the cost 
to replace the home in the event of a total loss.288 This involved personal 
inspections of the exterior, as well as drawn diagrams of the home (and later 
describing some of the information in writing to the homeowner, but actually 
calculating replacement value differently than as described).289 When their 
home was destroyed by fire, their coverage was less than 2/3rds of the true 
replacement value.290 On these facts, the trial court found the defendant 
negligent for providing an estimate represented as calculated one way when 
in fact it was calculated another way.291 The appellate court affirmed, but 
only because the agent did not use the Boeckh calculator – the court found 
that if the agent had done so then there would be no liability.292 
No wonder, as one California lawyer and insurance consultant wrote 
in 2017: 
[…]it is incumbent on the agent or broker to remind the applicant for 
insurance to set appropriate limits to avoid underinsurance…. When 
an insured loses everything in a catastrophe, he or she calls an 
insurance agent, insurance broker or insurance company to make a 
claim. When the claim is made, the insured is reminded of the limit 
of liability chosen, only to find it is inadequate to replace the 
house…. The insured will be angry and unwilling to accept the fact 
that the inadequate policy limit is due to his or her error. Suits are 
filed…only to find that the court will not cure the insured’s 
mistake.293 
Or as Professor Tom Baker writes, “insurance coverage 
litigation is simultaneously about abandonment and greed.”294 
                                                     
288 Id. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 374. 
291 Id. at 376. 
292 Id. at 377-78 (quoting, Gates v. Logan, 862 P.2d 134, 136 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1993) (“Ordinarily the insured knows the extent of his personal assets 
and ability to pay increased premiums better than the insurance agent.”) and 
Virgil R. Lee & Son, Inc., 754 P.2d 155, 157 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988) (“[I]t is 
the insured’s responsibility to advise the agent of the insurance he wants, 
including the limits of the policy to be issued.”)). 
293 Zalma supra note 238, at 23; accord Michael J. Geiger & Gregory J. 
Schwartz, Phantom Insurance Coverage in the New Underinsurance 
Gambit, 10 ENVTL. CL. J. 5 (1998). 
294 Tom Baker, Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract 
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So where does this leave the question of who bears the financial risk 
of any discrepancy between estimated and actual replacement costs? The 
answer is that it is mixed. But that with some frequency, the policyholder 
bears the risk.  
An example from litigation concretely illustrates the matter. When 
– in the wake of the 2017 Northern California wildfires – a group of USAA 
insureds sued USAA and Xactware, USAA demurred (the California 
procedural device for a pre-answer attack on the basis of the failure to state 
a claim) asserting it was only responsible for the contracted for policy limits, 
while Xactware demurred asserting it had no legal privity with individual 
policyholders.295 Both entities looked at the legal landscape and saw they 
could assert a plausible, possible safe harbor even if each knowingly 
understated the replacement cost of the insured homes.296 
This is why a 2011 article concludes: 
Homeowner insurance policyholders are ill-equipped to determine 
the appropriate limits for their insurance policies. The current legal 
framework defining insurers’ obligations to their insureds does not 
effectively account for this reality, in turn providing an incentive for 
insurers to sustain ambiguity and confusion regarding a duty to 
accurately assess replacement costs.297 
VI. MORAL HAZARD-LIKE PROBLEMS ENCOURAGING PERVASIVE, 
UNWITTING UNDERINSURANCE 
Insurers are neither charities nor churches. Insurers do not pay 
claims because insureds need the money, or because it is the ‘right’ thing to 
                                                     
Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1396 (1994). 
295 Defendant United Services Automobile Association’s Notice of 
Demurrer and Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint; 
Memorandum of Pints and Authorities in Support of Thereof, Bivin et al. v. 
United Services Auto. Ass’n et al., No. SCV261717 (Super. Ct. Cal. County 
of Sonoma, Apr. 5, 2018); Defendant Xactware Solutions, Inc.’s Notice of 
Demurrer and Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint; 
Memorandum of Pints and Authorities in Support Thereof, Bivin et al. v. 
United Services Auto. Ass’n et al., No. SCV261717 (Super. Ct. Cal. County 
of Sonoma, June 6, 2018). 
296 Id. 
297 Fox, supra note 253, at 394. 
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do.298 Insurers pay claims because they legally are obligated to do so. And as 
for-profit businesses, if regulators, legislators, and courts permit insurers to 
increase profits by precisely navigating the intersection of coverage limits 
and replacement cost estimating, then one should expect insurers to do so.  
But that still leaves hanging out there the question: If homeowners 
are willing to pay for full and adequate RCV and producers have incentives 
to sell full and adequate RCV, then why would an insurer either want to or 
knowingly tolerate the sale of nominally full but actually inadequate RCV? 
The short answer is an insurer may be rewarded for underinsuring and may 
be punished for over-insuring. Put another way, because the legal landscape 
protects insurers from the consequence of inadequate coverage, the aspects 
of cost estimating that result in nominally full but actually inadequate 
coverage turn out to be features rather than glitches.  
A. UNDERINSURING CAN BE PROFITABLE FOR INSURERS 
Altered incentives analogous to moral hazard concerns encourage an 
insurer to underinsure. There is no single, accepted definition of “moral 
hazard.”299 Krugman’s definition – “any situation in which one person makes 
the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the cost 
of things going badly”300 – is a quite workable big tent to encapsulate the 
many iterations of the concept.  
In insurance, there is much contemporary work on moral hazard.301 
In the context of predicting behaviors of insureds, simply stated, “Moral 
                                                     
298 See Tom Baker, Insuring Morality, 29 ECON. & SOC’Y. 559 (2010) 
(discussing the narratives and counter-narratives of morality in insurance).   
299 David Rowell & Luke B. Connelly, A History of the Term “Moral 
Hazard”, 79 J. RISK & INS. 1051 (2012); accord Tom Baker, On the 
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). 
300 See KRUGMAN, supra note 10, at 63; Definition of ‘Moral Hazard’, 
supra note 10, (“Moral hazard is a situation in which one party gets involved 
in a risky event knowing that it is protected against the risk and the other 
party will incur the cost.”). 
301 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: 
Further Comment, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK BEARING (Julius 
Margolis, ed.) (Markham 1971); Ralph A. Winter, Optimal Insurance Under 
Moral Hazard, reprinted in GEORGES DIONNE, HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 
155-183 (Georges Dionne ed., 2000) (describing how moral hazard leads to 
less than full insurance); Baker, supra note 293; Tom Baker, Containing the 
Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification, 9 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 371 (2003); Baker, supra note 298; John M. Marshall, Moral 
 
2018 MINDING THE PROTECTION GAP 99 
 
hazard refers…to the tendency of insurance protection to alter an 
individual’s motive to prevent loss.”302 Molk writes, “Moral hazard is a 
dominant concern of insurance companies….”303 But as Molk shows, at least 
in the context of homeowner insurance, there is considerable question 
whether the predictions the theory of moral hazard makes about policyholder 
behavior are confirmed by actual behavior.304  
 The theory of moral hazard actually seems to fare better in 
explaining actual behaviors of insurers.305 For example, when a state 
guarantees life insurance proceeds in the event of insurer insolvency, life 
insurers more frequently hold highly leveraged portfolios composed of risky 
assets.306 The same effect can be seen by banks in response to FDIC 
insurance: “It has been demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that 
deposit insurance for commercial banks and savings and loan associations 
(S&Ls) creates a moral hazard problem by shielding creditors from the 
consequences of risk taking.”307 Economists see similar behavior by 
property-casualty insurers in response to the likelihood of state and federal 
                                                     
Hazard, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 880 (1976); J.A. Mirreles, The Theory of Moral 
Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I, 66 REV. ECON. STUDIES 3 
(1999); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard, 58 AM. ECON. 
REV. 531 (1968); Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 92 
QUART. J. ECON. 541 (1979). 
302 Shavell, supra note 301, at 541. Under this definition, the general 
presumption is that full insurance coverage encourages risky behavior and 
so an insurer should not offer full coverage, but that if the cost of monitoring 
insured’s behavior is minimal, then coverage approaching full insurance is 
optimal. Id. at 541-42. 
303 Molk, supra note 11, at 349. 
304 Id. at 350-51, 392-93. 
305 See, e.g., Neil Bhutta & Benjamin J. Keys, Eyes Wide Shut? The 
Moral Hazard of Mortgage Insurers During the Housing Boom, (Nat’l. 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24844, 2018), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24844 (documenting moral hazard behavior 
of private mortgage insurers). 
306 Elijah Brewer III, Thomas S. Mondschean, & Philip E. Strahan, The 
Role of Monitoring in Reducing the Moral Hazard Problem Associated with 
Government Guarantees: Evidence From the Life Insurance Industry, 64 J. 
RISK & INS. 301, 304, 320 (1997); Brian J. Hall & and James G. Bohn, The 
Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 5911, 1997), https://ssrn.com/abstract=225693. 
307 Brewer, Mondschean, Strahan, supra note 306, at 301-04. 
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disaster recovery resources.308 As Tom Baker has explored and explained, 
one should fully expect that an insurer will be the economically, ruthlessly 
opportunistic actor predicted by the theory of moral hazard.309 
Replacement cost estimators do not give insurers control over the 
quantity of risk they underwrite, nor do they lead to insurers mis-pricing the 
risk. Rather, replacement cost estimators create an asymmetry of 
understanding between an insurer and a policyholder of quantity of risk 
being sold. Policyholders think they are buying truly full replacement 
coverage while insurers know the likelihood that the coverage limits could 
be inadequate. Economists might differ about whether this is a classic ‘moral 
hazard problem.’ But it unquestionably is an opportunity for an 
opportunistic, profit-maximizing motivated actor.  
An insurer knows – through years of accreted experience – that costs 
estimators pervasively calculate full replacement cost profoundly low. 
Insurers perceive that the customer is a low-information, price elastic 
customer; i.e., a customer likely to be attracted to a low premium and 
unlikely to be sensitive to the risk attendant to it.310 Most “underinsureds” 
will not ever sustain a total loss exposing the risk.311 Should that risk 
materialize, some insureds will be litigation averse (for any host of reasons 
including, perhaps, learning of the uncertain legal landscape) and thus not 
challenge the claims adjustment; of those who do, many either will settle at 
below the uninsured portion of the loss or will simply lack the resources to 
see the dispute through; and of the subset who do see the dispute through, 
                                                     
308 See, e.g., Paul Hudson, W.J. Wouter Botzen, Jeffrey Czajkowski, & 
Heidi Kreibich, Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets: 
Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States, 93 LAND ECON. 
179 (2017); Carolyn Kousky & Leonard Shabman, The Hazard of the Moral 
Hazard – or Not, NAT. HAZARDS OBSERVER (May 2013), https://hazards.col 
orado.edu/uploads/observer/2013/may13_observerweb.pdf; George L. Priest, 
The Government, the Market, and the Problem of Catastrophic Loss, 12 J. 
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 219 (1996). 
309 See Baker, supra note 298. 
310 See Ramsay & Heffernan, supra note 169, at 10-11; accord Insurance 
Brokers and Agents of the West, supra note 68.  
311 See, e.g., INS. INFO. INST., supra note 183 (“About one in 290 insured 
homes has a property damage claim related to fire and lightning.”); id. at 183 
(“In 2014, 5.46% of insured homes had a claim, according to ISO. Property 
damage, including theft, accounted for 95.9% of those claims.” The average 
insurance claim is for less than $10,000); Klein, supra note 3, at 353-54 (in 
2007, one-twentieth of one percent of U.S. homes had a disaster loss forcing 
relocation from the home). 
 
2018 MINDING THE PROTECTION GAP 101 
 
only some will recover the entirety of the uninsured portion of the loss.312 
Thus, if an insurer believes the net amount ultimately paid over stated 
coverage limits (including marginal additional Loss Adjusting Expenses) 
will be exceeded by the additional net premium captured by lowering full 
RCV coverage limits, then the insurer should underestimate replacement 
cost.313 Or put another way, an insurer who thought that the insured bore the 
                                                     
312 See generally Baker, supra note 294, at 1430-31 (describing some of 
the strategic behaviors of insurers to minimize the claims experience); 
Feinman, supra note 3, at 31-33, 80-85; Rutgers Center for Risk and 
Responsibility, supra note 231, at 37-44; accord Molk, supra note 11, at 46 
(positing that one explanation of his data on valued policies is that “insurers 
understand the legal playing field and price their policies accordingly”). 
313 Howard Kunreuther, The Role of Insurance in Reducing Losses from 
Extreme Events: The Need for Public-Private Partnerships, 40 GENEVA 
PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 741, 750-51 (2015) (“Insurance premiums should be 
based on risk to provide individuals with accurate signals as to the nature of 
the hazards they face and to encourage them to engage in cost-effective 
mitigation measures to reduce their vulnerability. Risk-based premiums 
should also reflect the cost of capital that insurers need to integrate into their 
pricing to assure an adequate return to their investors.”). The premise of 
insurance is risk-spreading among the pool of insureds –moral hazard as a 
theory of reducing insurance coverage should be inconsistent with this 
premise –but that is assuming that the premium has been calculated in an 
actuarially sound manner. Marshall, supra note 295, at 880. Premium priced 
accurately is loss risk plus underwriting and other transactions costs and 
profit. See, e.g., Paul L. Joskow, Cartels, Competition and Regulation in the 
Property-Liability Insurance Industry, 4 BELL J. ECON. & MGMNT. 375, 
377-78 (1973), reprinted IN FOUNDATIONS OF INSURANCE ECONOMICS: 
READINGS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 469, 470-71 (Georges Dionne & 
Scott E. Harrington, eds., Kluwer 1991) (Georges Dionne & Scott E. 
Harrington, eds., Kluwer 1991) (“Insurance is generally a ‘bad bet.’ That is 
to say, the premium is generally greater than the expected property loss 
without insurance. The difference between premiums and losses over time is 
made up of underwriting and transaction costs and the profit of the insurance 
firms.”). Accord Insurance Services Office, supra note 63, at 4 (“An insurer 
willing to pay the price of sufficient catastrophe insurance could have trouble 
competing for business.”); “Documents for which print copy is practically 
available:” Whitepaper, e2Value, How to Buy Data and Why Buy Data 2, 
http://e2value.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/E2Value_WP.pdf. 
(“Discrepancies between the estimation in a home valuation and the ultimate 
cost of rebuilding can present financial risk to firms who don’t get it right.”); 
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risk of understated coverage limits and who thought that this would capture 
more gross premium would not be troubled by, and indeed might be enthused 
by, an underwriting tool and process that understated full replacement 
cost.314 
Indeed, the Commissioner of the CDOI defended its RCV regulation 
(requiring RCV calculations, if done, to include at least twelve delineated 
components) to the California Supreme Court, at least in part, on the 
assertion that insurers were affirmatively misleading homeowners into 
believing that homeowners had adequate replacement coverage: 
We must bear in mind that the estimate here is of replacement cost, 
which is defined to mean “the amount that it would cost the insured 
to repair, rebuild, or replace the thing lost or injured, without a 
deduction for physical depreciation, or the policy limit, whichever is 
less.” …A consumer would reasonably believe that an estimate 
would have considered basic cost components, she would rely on 
that estimate to set the limit of liability on the policy, and she would 
be bound by that limit in the event of a loss. An incomplete estimate 
would result in a low estimate for the primary dwelling (Coverage 
A) and would mislead a consumer into believing that the coverage 
limit selected as a result of the incomplete estimate is sufficient when 
in fact it is not sufficient to rebuild a home. …an insurer would or 
should know that an estimate based on incomplete data is 
misleading.315 
The California Supreme Court found, “The Commissioner could 
reasonably conclude that replacement cost estimates are likely to mislead the 
public about the actual cost of repair or replacement when they willfully omit 
                                                     
Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, Misselling through Agents, 99 AM. 
ECON. REV. 883 (2009). See also Collier & Ragin, supra note 62, at 1 
(“sellers have incentives to overstate a contract’s benefits or to recommend 
suboptimal products”), citing Inderst and Ottaviani. See also Howard C. 
Mahler, An Introduction to Underwriting Profit Models (1987), 
https://www.casact.org/pubs/proceed/proceed85/85239.pdf. 
314 See Feinman, supra note 3, at 136-38; accord Bhutta & Keys, supra 
note 305, at 11. 
315 Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 222, at *12-13 (internal 
footnote omitted). 
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cost components essential to repairing or rebuilding a dwelling.”316 The 
Court rejected the challenge to the regulation.317 
One might find implausible this explanation of why an insurer might 
want to underinsure. But the fact remains that insurers routinely do 
underinsure, underinsure by very large margins, and have been doing so now 
for decades. The standard in the industry used to be guaranteed replacement 
coverage, but for the last almost thirty years it has been RCV with coverage 
limits.318 And it bears keeping in mind that the RCV estimation tools claim 
to already price in inflation, building cost changes, local market cost 
variability, catastrophe risk, and demand surge. If full replacement coverage 
limits nonetheless still routinely are materially below actual, accurately 
estimated, full replacement costs (they are), then insurers know it and have 
known it for a while.319  
A bit more needs to be said about one price inflator in particular – 
natural disaster. One might posit that what is occurring is the unanticipated 
consequence of natural catastrophes. But the insurance industry asserts it has 
solved this challenge: “Catastrophe models have been developed and 
improved over the past 25 years to more accurately assess the likelihood and 
damages resulting from disasters of different magnitudes and intensities. 
Today, insurers and reinsurers utilize the estimates from these models to 
determine risk-based premiums and how much coverage to offer in hazard-
prone areas.”320 Today, the insurance industry in general, and Verisk and 
CoreLogic in particular, deeply study wildfire and other catastrophe risk,321 
and claim they now can expertly underwrite such risk even at the granularity 
                                                     
316 Ass’n of Cal. Ins. Cos. v. Jones, 386 P.3d 1188, 1203 (Cal. 2017). 
317 Id. at 401. 
318 See supra Klein, note 3, at 364; Feinman, supra note 3, at 135-36. 
319 In the public record of underinsurance complaints after wildfires in 
California in 2007, there are repeated references to insurers using Xactware, 
RCT, MSB, or generic ‘cost estimators’ – each of these is an instance where 
the resulting estimated RCV led to underinsurance. See, e.g., Administrative 
Rulemaking File for CAL. CODE REGS., tit.10, § 2695.183, supra note 4, at 
74, 146, 154, 186, 196, 227, 371, 417, 442, 464, 520, 620, 624, 678, 689, 
699, 717, 745, 769, 834-35, 969, 974, 993. Guaranteed replacement coverage 
stopped being the ‘norm” roughly twenty-five years ago. See supra Klein, 
note 3, at 364; Feinman, supra note 3, at 135-36. Insurers have had two and 
a half decades of experience with understated replacement costs from cost 
estimators. 
320 Kunreuther, supra note 313, at 750. 
321 See INS. INFO. INST., supra note 157; VERISK, supra note 157. 
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forecasting risk to an individual house.322 And indeed, contrary to intuitive 
expectations, catastrophic events do not, on average, have statistically 
significant relationships to homeowner insurance market outcomes.323 
Simply put, catastrophe loss already is priced into the premium, or at least 
so it is claimed. But more to the point, even if demand surge was 
inadequately accounted for in the algorithms, then ‘extended’ coverage 
riders would be sufficient to cover the additional risk, yet the CDOI found 
most of the time even then coverage was inadequate. 
B. AN INSURER MAY BE PUNISHED FOR OVER-INSURING 
While an insurer may be rewarded for underinsuring, an insurer also 
may be punished for over-insuring. Collier & Ragin found 11.7% of insureds 
chose to over-insure.324  
Over-insurance is a valid concern for insurers. In valued policy 
states, in the event of a total loss an insurer is required to pay the full 
coverage limit even if that coverage limit exceeds the actual full replacement 
cost.325 An insurer thus may (perhaps should) be worried that a policyholder 
                                                     
322See, e.g., Scott G. Stephenson, Resilience: Higher Ground in the Face 
of Disaster, VERISK (2018), https://www.verisk.com/verisk-review/fall-
2017/resilience-higher-ground-in-the-face-of-disaster/ (“advanced computer 
models can offer a view into scenarios for different perils—the major ones 
might include wind, flood, earthquake, and wildfire. Such models can give 
[insurers, emergency managers, and government officials] a basic 
understanding of potential losses they could experience or are likely to 
experience.”); VERISK, supra note 93, at 6 (“Because many of the data 
elements needed for replacement cost estimates are the same elements 
needed for catastrophe modeling, 360Value is ideally suited to capture the 
detailed, property-specific data needed for effective catastrophe analysis. 
The point in the underwriting process when replacement cost is reviewed 
may also be an ideal opportunity to check on catastrophe risk. 360Value, the 
only replacement cost estimator that fully supports catastrophe risk 
management programs, can:...assess catastrophe risk on individual 
properties before the policy is underwritten using a built-in connection to 
AIR Worldwide catastrophe models.”). 
323 Patricia Born & Robert W. Klein, Catastrophe Risk and the 
Regulation of Property Insurance Markets, 35 J. INS. REG. 1, 31 (2016). 
324 Collier & Ragin, supra note 19, at 12, Table 3.  
325 See Molk, supra note 11, at 17, 19. 
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would buy excessive insurance as a hedge to escape a financially perilous 
position in the wake depreciating home values.326 
This is analogous to an “adverse selection problem.”327 “Adverse 
selection occurs in insurance markets when information is asymmetric; i.e., 
when an insurer cannot observe an individual’s risk at the time policies are 
issued and the individual has superior information about his or her risk.”328 
An example of adverse selection in insurance is when the highest risk 
individuals disproportionately purchase coverage, thereby raising 
everyone’s premiums and pricing the general population out of the market 
(a market failure); or put another way, “we tend to trust the people we 
shouldn’t!”329  
Perhaps because of valued policy states, a lot of work has focused 
on insured adverse selection problems.330 And whether in a valued policy 
state or not, insurers have a variety of tools to address the concern. An insurer 
will engage in ex ante screening of applicants to raise premiums or deny 
coverage to an applicant who they expect to have a high claims experience 
(an insured apparently adversely selecting the insurer).331 An insurer may, 
                                                     
326 See Molk, supra note 11 (analyzing the theoretical concerns with 
valued policies and how the concerns are not borne out by actual behavior). 
327See generally Georges Dionne, Neil Doherty, & Nathalie Fombaron, 
Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets, reprinted in GEORGES DIONNE, 
HANDBOOK OF INS. 225 (Georges Dionne et al. eds, 2000) (“Although in 
many situations principals face adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
simultaneously when they design contracts, these types of asymmetrical 
information have been given separate treatments so far in the economic 
literature on risk-sharing agreements…More recently, some authors have 
attempted to integrate both information problems into a single model ... Such 
an integration of both information problems is warranted on empirical 
grounds.”). 
328 Dionne & Harrington, supra note 207, at 18.  
329 Information Economics – Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, 
TUTOR2U, https://www.tutor2u.net/economics/reference/information-econo 
mics-moral-hazard-and-adverse-selection (last visited Sep. 7, 2018). 
330 See, e.g., Alma Cohen & Peter Siegelman, Testing for Adverse 
Selection in Insurance Markets, 77 J. RISK & INS. 39, 39-43 (2010). 
331See, e.g., Dionne & Harrington, supra note 207, at 20 (“Experience 
rating can be viewed as either a substitute or a compliment to both risk 
categorization and sorting contracts with self-selection constraints when 
adverse selection is present.”); Robert Puelz & Arthur Snow, Evidence on 
Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the 
Insurance Market, 102 J. POL ECON. 236, 237, 255 (1994) (“firms engage in 
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when permitted by state law, have an insurable interest requirement capping 
payouts at the actual loss.332 Or an insurer may simply intentionally resist 
high coverage limits.333 Regardless of the approach an insurer takes, 
however, an insurer’s passivity in refining cost estimators in ways that would 
raise RCV coverage limits may be a predictable and understandable response 
to the pressures on an insurer to not over-insure.334 
C. REPUTATIONAL CONCERNS AND MARKET MECHANISMS 
A brief word needs to be said about reputational interests and market 
mechanisms. One could posit that because of concerns of harm to reputation, 
an insurer would not knowingly permit inadequate, unwitting coverage 
limits. This conjecture, however, is called into question by e2Value’s market 
positioning strategy, and that strategy’s lack of resulting market penetration, 
at least so far. The e2Value patent explicitly asserts that it is a cost estimating 
innovation that cures the prevalent inaccuracy problems of other estimators. 
This is the core of e2Value’s marketing pitch to insurers. Thus far, e2Value 
has yet to achieve much of a beachhead in the cost estimating market. 
Apparently, the prevalence and depth of inaccurate and inadequate coverage 
limits has yet to be a dominating reputational concern among insurers.335 
Further, the prevalence of underinsurance is a recurrent news story in the 
                                                     
screening activities by assigning each insurance applicant to a particular risk 
category”); Home buyers haunted by past owners’ claims, INSURE.COM (July 
6, 2017), https://www.insure.com/home-insurance/past-claims.html (“loss 
history reports alert insurers to properties that carry potentially more risk 
than they are willing to assume”). See generally Keith J. Crocker & Arthur 
Snow, The Efficiency Effects of Categorical Discrimination in the Insurance 
Industry, 94 J. POL ECON. 321 (1986), reprinted in FOUNDATIONS OF 
INSURANCE ECONOMICS: READINGS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 444 
(Georges Dionne & Scott E. Harrington eds., 1991). Accord Rutgers Center 
for Risk and Responsibility, supra note 231, at 22-23. 
332 See Molk, supra note 11, at 363. 
333 See Molk, supra note 11, at 391.  See also Definition of moral hazard, 
FT.COM/LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=moral-hazard (“There 
are concerns that some individuals that take out large insurance policies to 
cover specific risks are likely to claim against such policies.... Insurance 
firms...use screening techniques to try and identify such customers and 
monitor their behavior.”). 
334 Molk, supra note 11, at 386 n.140. 
335 Bhutta & Keys, supra note 305, at 33, 36. 
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wake of natural disaster, often punctuated by homeowners calling out 
insurers by name. But underinsurance persists unabated. 
Similarly, one might expect a properly functioning competitive 
market to adjust through normal market mechanisms to punish an insurer 
who persistently set coverage limits materially inadequately. The most that 
can be said about this expectation is that while explanations as to why may 
vary, thus far the market has not evidenced any adjustment. 
VII. A PROPOSED REGULATORY RESOLUTION OF PERVASIVE 
UNDERINSURANCE 
Homeowner insurance is an interesting market. It is dominated by 
low information, largely unengaged, nonetheless arguably highly price 
elastic customers, buying coverage that is complex to accurately underwrite 
and challenging to price shop.336 In other words, most customers are to some 
degree or another apathetic about buying insurance, and to whatever degree 
a customer is price sensitive, they often are ill-positioned to do anything 
about it. 
Simultaneously, insurers face their own challenge. Building a house 
is a complex problem. And precisely projecting a replacement cost at an 
indeterminate point in the future is an impossibility. If an insurer can shift 
risk of error, then one would expect insurers to do so.337 And capping 
replacement coverage limits has indeed become a common and effective 
insurance strategy for insurers to shift risk to a homeowner and/or 
government authority.338 That strategy works because the insurer is working 
within a legal landscape that separates risk from responsibility. Companies 
                                                     
336 Contrast this, for example, with automobile insurance – pricing the 
actual or replacement value of a car is straightforward, the likelihood of 
material error is small, and price comparison tools are ubiquitous. 
337 Santosh Anagol, Shawn Cole, & Shayak Sarkar, Understanding the 
Advice of Commissions- Motivated Agents: Evidence from the Indian Life 
Insurance Market, 99 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2017) (commission structures 
caused agents to sell inappropriate life insurance to low information 
customers.). 
338 See, e.g., J. Robert Hunter, The Insurance Industry’s Incredible 
Disappearing Weather Catastrophe Risk: How Insurers Have Shifted Risk 
and Costs Associated with Weather Catastrophes to Consumers and 
Taxpayers, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, Feb. 17, 2012, at 4-6, 9-
11. 
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pursue business strategies that the laws (as interpreted) and regulations 
reward.339  
And yet consider the resulting dilemma consumers of homeowner 
insurance finds themselves in: The ubiquitous consumer information of state 
insurance commissioners advises homeowners to be cautious and seek full 
replacement coverage, and further advises that if the homeowner is unsure 
how much that is, then the homeowner should ask their insurer or agent.340 
Many insurers or agents, however, will only describe an amount as a 
‘minimum’ and will assert that the ultimate responsibility for adequate 
insurance is on the homeowner. The legal landscape frequently enforces this 
language. The problem is dizzying. 
But there is a solution. Fundamentally what is occurring is that the 
information and expertise that form the basis of an informed, estimated 
replacement cost is remote from the responsibility if that estimate is 
profoundly in error.  
There are a host of ways one might modify the legal landscape to 
close the resulting protection gap.341 But fundamentally, any solution will 
fail that assumes either that adequate coverage is susceptible of consistent, 
accurate calculation, or that broadly and ubiquitously consumers will 
become informed buyers. Facts on the ground repeatedly expose those 
approaches as overly Pollyannaish.  
Indeed, the CDOI – in defending its regulation defining how to 
estimate replacement cost – detailed (albeit inadvertently) many of the 
reasons that its solution could fail to remedy the problem of underinsurance: 
The Regulation does not affect underwriting. It does not specify, 
require, or otherwise mandate…which risks they decide to insure 
against, what policy limits they wish to insure, or what price to 
charge for a policy. It does not require insurers to estimate 
replacement cost or recommend a policy limit, does not prevent 
insurers from including additional factors in determining the 
estimate, does not prohibit an insurer from setting a minimum or 
maximum amount of coverage or any amount of coverage that is 
                                                     
339 Accord Baker, supra note 294, at 1401 (“All that an insurance 
company has to sell is its promise to pay...the better an insurance company 
is at avoiding that promise, the more money it makes.”). 
340 See supra text accompanying note 69. 
341 See, e.g., Holzheu & Turner, supra note 217, at 56-62. 
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different from the estimate of replacement cost, and does not prohibit 
a consumer from obtaining his or her own estimate.342 
A more likely to succeed solution would re-couple risk and 
responsibility by requiring an insurer essentially to quote guaranteed 
replacement coverage and allowing the insurer to underwrite and price that 
coverage in anyway it chooses, so long as the rate is approved by the DOI. 
If the policyholder chooses to reject that coverage, then the policyholder 
bears the risk of underinsurance. If the policyholder accepts that coverage, 
then the insurer bears the risk of underinsurance. That legislation might read 
something like this: 
 (a) For every policy of residential property insurance that is newly 
issued or renewed in this state, an insurer shall offer insurance 
for the full replacement of the insured property.  
(b) If the insured purchases the policy or renewal described in 
section (a), then in the event that the policy coverage limit is not 
sufficient to replace the insured property, the insurer shall be 
liable for the actual replacement cost. 
(c) If the insured does not purchase the policy or renewal described 
in section (a), then in the event that the policy coverage limit is 
not sufficient to replace the insured property, the insurer shall 
not be liable for the actual replacement cost.  
(d) This section shall not be deemed to limit or preclude an insurer 
and insured from agreeing to provide coverage for a policy limit 
that is greater or lesser than the estimate of replacement value 
provided in accordance with subdivision (a). 
The advantages to a policyholder of this approach are patent. But 
there are advantages to insurers as well. This approach allows each insurer 
to model confidence levels and margins of error, and then decide what 
business strategy makes most sense to it. One insurer might be aggressive in 
pricing premium and calculating limits, determining that the realized volume 
of market share justifies the risk exposure of understated limits. Another 
insurer might come to a more conservative solution. And both approaches 
would be permitted without exposing policyholders or government 
resources. 
Further, this will reconnect risk creation and risk allocation. The core 
challenge is that replacement cost estimators, as with any predictive tool, 
have margins of error. It is the seller of the software who sets the parameters 
                                                     
342 Appellant’s Reply Brief, Ass’n. of Cal. Ins. Cos., 235 Cal. App. 4th 
1009 (internal citations omitted).  
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and algorithms, and thus can make the estimator neutral, biased to a 
conservative estimate, or biased to an aggressive estimate. That is a matter 
of negotiation with an insurer and a marketing strategy by the software 
company. But the risk of error should be allocated between those two 
entities, rather than passed through to an unwitting consumer. 
If this solution is adopted, then premiums may rise. And yet, one 
must query, why? The providers of replacement cost estimators claim their 
tools already precisely underwrite total replacement coverage, accounting 
appropriately for general inflation, historical trends in building costs, 
localized market idiosyncrasies, demand surge pricing in the wake of mass 
loss, and the risk to a particular address of being part of a mass loss. If so, 
then prices should not move at all. Frankly, however, recent claims history 
in the wake of wildfire suggests that these product claims – at least at present 
– range more toward aspirations than descriptions.  
If these are (at least for now) hollow promises, then yes, prices will 
rise, as they should. It is important to accurately price risk so long as this 
does not equate to price gouging. It is a core competency of Departments of 
Insurance. And the constant political debate surrounding flood insurance 
demonstrates the challenges of trying to artificially suppress price.343 If the 
last 30 years stands for nothing else, it serves as stark proof that a world of 
unwitting underinsurance carries real and unnecessary cost.344  
There will be a concern, of course, that a price elastic, ill-informed 
and/or disengaged consumer will decline (to their disadvantage) full 
replacement coverage. The experience of consumer buying decisions to date, 
however, suggests to the contrary – homeowners largely want full insurance 
and largely are willing to pay for it. 
                                                     
343 See generally Molk, supra note 11, at 5 n.16; Anthony Cappelletti, 
National Flood Insurance Program: Reauthorization 2017, SOCIETY OF 
ACTUARIES (June 2017), https://www.soa.org/News-and-Publications/News 
letters/General-Insurance/2017/june/National-Flood-Insurance-Program--
Reauthorization-2017.aspx; Carolyn Kousky & Leonard Shabman, How and 
Why the NFIP Differs from a Private Insurance Company, RESOURCES FOR 
THE FUTURE (2014), http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Down 
load/RFF-DP-14-37.pdf. 
344 A separate and perhaps more profound concern is that some areas will 
have such high fire risk that insurers will refuse to write insurance quotes at 
all. See, e.g., Jackie Botts, As Fire Seasons Intensify, California 
Homeowners Struggle to Stay Insured, PAC. STANDARD (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://psmag.com/environment/as-fire-seasons-intensify-california-homeo 
wners-struggle-to-stay-insured. 
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CONCLUSION 
Natural disasters have exposed that literally millions of Americans, 
are unknowingly, profoundly, inadequately insured. This is not only a private 
problem, but a public one, as government frequently is the resource of last 
resort when homeowners become homeless. The problem of unintended, 
significant, widespread underinsurance has been ongoing for decades. But it 
is solvable. The solution is to combine the known product of guaranteed 
replacement coverage, on the one hand, with preserving the business 
flexibility of insurers to idiosyncratically tailor products to consumers, on 
the other hand. To paraphrase an apocryphal old advice column, this solution 
falls into that special category of appropriate called “high time.” 
